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ABSTRACT
The Hudson Highlands were the single most important 
piece of terrain in North America during the War of American 
Independence. It was vital that this point be defended to 
prevent New England from being severed from the rest of the 
colonies.
During 1775 and 1776 the Continental Congress and the 
New York Provincial Congress erected a series of fortifica­
tions in the Highlands. By a system of trial and error the 
Americans established the precedent that the Highlands were 
to constitute a distinct force operating independently from 
the field armies and directly responsible to General George 
Washington.
. In 1777 the British planners failed to appreciate the 
value of the Highlands. General Israel Putnam, the commander 
of the Highlands during the campaign of 1777, ineptly 
handled his forces and was completely outnaneuvored by 
General Henry Clinton who captured the Highlands on 6 
October 1777* He had too few men to retain them, and was 
unable to move soon enough to rescue Burgoyne.
The British failure to retain control of the Highlands 
represents one of the three * turning points* of the war. 
Although the Battle of Saratoga was decisive diplomatically, 
and the experience at Valley Forge matured the tactical 
organization of the American army, it was with this 
temporary loss of the Highlands that Washington came of age 
strategically. To prevent a repetition he constructed 
Fortress West Point and never let the field army leave 
supporting distance of the Highlands. This strategy 
stalemated the British in the northern colonies.
v
TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE:
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777 IN THE HTTDSON HIGHLANDS
CHAPTER I 
GEOGRAPHY OP THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS
The Hudson River flows from north to south, originating 
near Lake George, and emptying into the sea at New York 
City, For the majority of Its length it passes through low, 
rolling country. Sixty-two miles above Mew York City 
there is an abrupt change In the nature of the terrain and 
the course of the river. At this point, the river 
enters a twelve-mile wide strip of mountainous country 
known as the Hudson Highlands.
The Hudson Highlands are a spur of the Appalachian 
Mountain chain that properly begins near the Pennsylvania- 
New Jersey border and runs north-west to the Vermont-New 
Hampshire border. Technically the Highlands here will be 
considered as the area immediately bordering the Hudson 
River. The principle peaks on the west side from north
i
to south are Storm King Mountain, Bear Mountain, and the 
Dund.erburg. On the east bank the hills are not as 
sharply defined. Breakneck Ridge, Anthony1s Nose, and 
the Peekskill hills correspond respectively to the three
1. For convenience sake, and because contemporary
spellings were never uniform, modern spellings have 
been used throughout this paper. See Map 1.
2
3Map 1
The Hudson Highlands*
’■* Based on Robert Erskine, A Map of the Highlands in the 
State of New York Done for his Excellence Genl Washington 
By Robert Erskine F*B.S. Geog. To ihe Army July 1?79» 
in the possession of the History Society of Pennsylvania.
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chief western peaks* These heights rise to over one 
thousand feet above the level of the river, and the 
banks are frequently one hundred feet high.
The Hudson River follows an essentially southern 
course throughout most of its length. In the Highlands, 
the harder granite and complex gneiss rock formations 
eroded more unevenly. This has resulted in abrupt 
changes in the direction of the river. The high shores 
also senve to funnel the winds, which hinders the progre 
of sailing vessels. To compound this difficulty, the 
river is also tidal for a distance above the Highlands. 
The principle bends occur at points where the river also 
narrows sharply. The southern pair of right-angle bends 
is located at the twelve hundred foot high Anthony * s 
Nose at the site of Bear Mountain State Park. The river 
here narrows to approximately sixteen hundred, feet and 
this tunneling effect has carved a channel ninety feet 
d.eep* Six miles further north at West Point there is 
another pair of right-angle bends around the point and 
Constitution Island (or Martelaer's Rock). The river 
here is three hundred feet narrower than at Bear Mountax 
but just as deep, which results in the tidal surges 
being less abrupt.
Both above and below the Highlands the river is 
considerably wider. But the result of this widening 
coupled with the less severe banks has resulted in 
noticeable differences in the river. The channel in
5these areas is narrower, with extensive shoals. Furthermore, 
the course of the river is relatively direct, without 
abrupt changes in direction.
In 177.5 the Highlands were rough country. The harsh 
nature of the terrain is particularly evident today to a 
motorist driving along either the Palisades Interstate 
Parkway or New York Route Nine West. On 10 June 1778 
Surgeon James Thacher reported on the view from Storm King 
Mountain•
Looking down as from a cloud, we beheld the Hudson, 
resembling a vast canal cut through mountains of 
stupendous magnitude, a few boats playing on its 
surface were scarcely visible. But to the pen of 
the post and the pencil of the painter, be con­
signed the task of describing the wonders of 
nature there exhibited, in the form of'huge 
mountains, reeky cliffs, and venerable forests, 
in one confused mass.1"
This area, and especially the west bank, was sparsely
1settled in 1775 3rd still largely virgin forest.
The west bank of the Higlands was contained in Ulster 
Coimty. Its centers of population were Newburgh, just 
above Storm King Mountain, and New Windsor, several miles 
further north. New Windsor had a population of almost 
one thousand and was a river town of fifty buildings.
Newburgh was also a river town situated on Plum Point, 
across from Polopel Island, and of a lesser size.
2. James Thacher, A Midita^y Journal During the American 
Revolutiorarv War (2nd ed.; Poston: Cottons & Bernard,
1.827), p. 1?2. ■
3. A* Elwood Corning, Wes Mutton at Temple Hill (Newburgh, 
N.Y.: Lanmere Publishing Company, 1932*5 , "D*
Ibid.. p. 5.
5. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Because the river was navigable to ships which could cross
the bar at New York harbor, the towns of the Highlands
were situated to provide access to the river. ^Land
transportation was rudimentary, and the roads poor. Even
the Clove, as the Upper Ramapo Valley was called, which
provided the principle road to New Jersey and the south, was
primitive, although passable for wagons.
Dutchess County encompassed the eastern portion of the
Highlands. Because it was more populous, and. because it
was contiguous to the settled areas of New York and
Connecticut, Dutchess had a more extensive road network.
Fishkill was its largest town with fifty buildings astride
6the road to New England. Peekskill, a hamlet of twenty 
houses in 1775, possessed docks which made it the center
7of the river trade and a main stop in the Albany Post Road.
The bulk of the county was owned by Pierre Van Courtlandt,
8who had sided with the patriots in 177^K" The other major 
landowner was Beverly Robinson, who resided opposite West 
Point and subsequently became an ardent loyalist.
The area north of the Highlands was included in Albany 
County. Between the Highlands and New York harbor were two 
counties. On the east bank was Westchester County,
6. Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America in the 
Year s 179 0 , 1781 and 1 ?8 2 9 tran s. ed. (Lond.o n : G . G „ J .
and J. Robinson, 1787; Reprint ed.; New York: Arno
Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 68.
7. Emma L. Patterson, Peekskill in the American Revolution. 
(Peekskill, N.Y. : Friendly Town Association, 19^),
p. 1 •
8 . Ibid., p. 6.
stretching south-east to Long Island Sound* On the west
bank Orange County, with its largest town of Tappan,
stretched to the New Jersey border.
Communications between New England and the other
colonies passed through New York City, but there were
subsidiary routes through the Highlands and lower reaches
of the Hudson. Below the Highlands, Dobbs Ferry crossed
at the southern edge of the Tappan Zee. In the Highlands
proper Kings Ferry, a clumsy, square-ended flatboat
propelled by sweeps, crossed between Verplanck * s Point on
o
the east and Stony Point on the west.' Above the 
Highlands there were several crossing points including New 
Windsor and Albany.
Strategically, the importance of the Hudson River Valle 
had been recognized in the Colonial Wars. The navigability 
of the river for warships as far as Albany provided a means 
for the Royal Navy to penetrate effectively far inland. At 
the same time the Richelieu River-Lake Champlain-Lake 
George route gave water access from Canada. There were only 
three places where this penetration could be easily blocked. 
One was New York City; another was Fort Txcorderoga. The 
third, of no importance in the colonial wars because the 
emphasis was directed against Canada, was the Highlands. 
During the War of American Independence when the Royal 
Navy was hostile, the Highlands emerged preeminent. The 
Highlands provided the one solid defensive position where
9» Ibid., p. 6
an inferior American army could block the Royal Navy and
the British Army, Not only was the terrain suited for
tactical defense by an alert commander, but he^vy artillery
emplaced at the proper positions could take advantage of
the bends, tides, and winds to deny the passage of the
river to shipping. In addition to the difficulty in
tactical operations, the great extent of the mountain
10chain prevented even strategic outflanking.
10. The best examination of this subject is in Gerald C. 
Stowe and Jac Weller, "Revolutionary West Point:
’The Key to the Continent,1" Military Affairs. XX 
(Summer., 1956), pp. 81-98.
CHAPTER II 
17 75
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the Second 
Continental Congress realized the strategic importance of 
the Highlands. They resolved on 25 Hay 1775 to have for­
tifications erected on the north end of Manhattan Island 
at Kings Bridge, and in the Highlands to bar navigation 
of the r i v e r T h e  New York Provincial Congress, author­
ized by the Continental Congress to undertake this 
fortification, formed a committee to inspect the area on 
30 May. Colonel James Clinton and Christopher Tappan,
both delegates from Ulster County, were selected as the
2
members of the committee.. Their report, with an
Illustrative map, was submitted on 10 June, and they were
instructed to prepare a cover letter to the New York
delegates to the Continental Congress to accompany a 'copy
a
of the report.
1. Continenta1 Congress, Journals of the Continental
Congress 1774-1789, ed. by Worthington C. Ford (?A 
vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office:
1904-3?), II, pp. 59-60,
2. Peter Force, ed., American Arch1ves: A Collection of
Authentio Records, State Parers. Pebates , and Letters 
and other Not:* res of Public Affairs. ~T9 vols. ; 
Washington: M, St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-
1853),"Series 4, II, p. 1266.
3. Ibid.. Ser. 4, II, p. 1291.
9
10
This report was sent on 13 June, In it, James Clinton 
and Tappan stated that they had completed their survey in 
the company of Captain Samuel Bayard and Captain Erasmus 
Williams, In their opinion, a force of three hundred men 
at Constitution Island and two hundred at Popolopen Creek, 
opposite Anthony1s Nose, would be sufficient. The works 
constructed at these points could make the cost of forcing 
a passage prohibitive. They suggested that stone and lime 
be used as the construction materials because their 
relative availability made them cheaper. The?/- also recom­
mended that a boorn be installed to block the passage at 
short notice, several small boats be procured for communi­
cations, and a. large magazine be built at Constitution 
Island. The estimated cost of all these measures was £ 1>00.
On 18 August the New York Congress resolved to build 
the fortifications according to the recommendations of this 
report. Five Commissioners were elected to supervise the 
work, with the provision that any three would form a quorum. 
Isaac Sears, John Berrien, Christopher Miller, Anthony 
Rutgers, and Colonel Edward Fleming were elected as 
Commissioners. Four days later Captain Bayard and Captain 
William Bedlow were elected to replace Fleming and Rutgers 
who could not participate for personal reasons. At this 
time, authorization was also give for the procurement of 
cannon and stores for the Highlands and for the organization
1295-6.
5* Ibid., Ser. b, III, p. 535.
11
6of the militia of the state. A sixth Commissioner,
Thomas Grenell, was selected on 6 September and an initial
7£250 was advanced to Captain Bedlow.
The first of many controversies erupted on 13 
September when the New York Congress requested Brigadier 
General David Wooster to send one company of his Continental 
troops to the Highlands to assist in the construction of 
the fortifications and to garrison them. They cited as 
their authority instructions from the Continental Congress
o
to do this. In a letter on 15 September Wooster politely
refused to comply. He reasoned that since he had received
orders from Lieutenant General George Washington to avoid
dispersing his forces, he could not send the requested
company until he received orders to that effect from
q
Washington or the Continental Congress * After another
exchange of letters, the New York Congress gave up and
1 0referred the matter to Philadelphia.
In the meantime, work had begun on the first set of 
works on Constitution Island. On 1^1- September Bernard 
Romans, the engineer appointed to supervise construction, 
submitted his plans and maos for the minimum defences 
necessary for Constitution Island to the New York Congress. 
He called for five blockhouses, a battery, a magazine,
6 . Ibid.. Ser. III, pp. 541-2.
?• Ibid'. . Ser. 4, III, p. 880.
8. Ibid.. Ser. 4, III, p. 893.
9 . Ibid., Ser. 4, III, pu. 397-8.
10. Ibid— , Ser. 4, III, pp. 732-5.
12
storehouses, a guardroom, a barracks, and stonework. His
estimate of the expense of erecting these buildings,
11including labor, was *46^5, ^s, 4d. On 19 September 
the New York Congress forwarded them to the Continental 
Congress. In their covering letter they stated that 
incidental expenses would probably amount to an additional
£1500.12
Also on 19 September the New York Committee of Safety,
the organization of the Mew York Congress which met during
periods of adjournment, took steps to secure title to
Constitution Island. A letter was -drafted to Beverly
Robinson stating that Continental Congress had authorized
the construction of a fort on the east bank of the Hudson
opposite West Point.
As the Provincial Congress by no means intend to 
invade private property, this Committee, in their 
recess, have thought proper to request you put a 
reasonable price upon the whole point of dry land 
or Island, called N a r t e 1 a e r 1 s Ro ck Island, which 
price, if they approve of it, they are ready to pay 
you for it.15
Robinson*s reply of 2 October stated that while he would
have been happy to let them use the island since there
Ak,
was little arable land, he did not own it. He mentioned 
that the property was owned by a Mrs. Ogilvie and her 
children. Apparently the matter was not pursued further 
since no subsequent mention was made of it.
11. Jbid., Ser. *!■, Ill, pp. 735-6.
12. Ibid., Ser. 'l, III, pp. 732-3.
13* Ibid. . Ser. III, p. 902.
1 'i. Ibid., Ser. III, p. 127**.
13
A second quarrel erupted when Commissioners Hanson, 
Bedlow, and Bayard wrote the Committee of Safety on 25 
September. This letter includes the first reference to the 
new fort as Port Constitution, from which the island has 
derived its current name. In their letter, the Commissioners 
complained that the Committee of Safety should have con­
sulted them before writing the Continental Congress on 
19 September. In their opinion, Romans' plans were not only 
insufficient for more than a temporary delay, but the 
position would require an unwarranted expense to be made 
defensible. They further requested that .the Committee of 
Safety establish whether they were in charge of Romans, or 
he was in charge of them. As a footnote they mentioned 
that while the first cannon were to be emplaced that week, 
the Royal Governor, William Tryon, and several associates
had been at Haverstraw on 23 September and had questioned
1 5Captain Palmer about the state of the works. ^
Romans appeared before the Committee of Safety on
29 September and offered to contract to build the fort
under his sole management for £ 5000, exclusive of cannon.
He stipulated that the Commissioners would only supervise
16his execution of the works. The next day the Committee 
again questioned him. They then informed him that they 
would not contract for the works but would employ him 
as engineer at the temporary pay of a Continental Colonel.
15. Ibid., Ser. III, pp. 91^-5.
16. Ibid,3 Ser. iv, III, pp. 916-7.
14
This was neither the twenty shillings a day which he
claimed was the pay of a British engineer nor the twelve
shillings which was actually the case.^ T-foe .Commissioners
were also instructed to assist Romans as engineer on that 
18day• Apparently on the basis of this pay rate Romans
began referring to himself as colonel.
The 19 September communication to the Continental
Congress was debated from 5 to 7 October in Philadelphia.
John Adams recorded tViat on 5 October a favorable response
to Romans* plan was voiced by several delegates on the
grounds that fortification should either be effectively
1Qprosecuted or dropped entirely. ' On 6 October John
Morton, Silas Deane, and Robert Livingston were elected
as a committee to examine the letter and deliver a report
20on it the next day.
This report was delivered on schedule, and after 
being debated, a letter to the New York Congress was
authorized. New York was directed to render the river
immediately defensible, with first emphasis to be given 
to those portions which could be finished before winter 
set in. Wood or fascines were suggested as building 
materials for this reason. But the New York Congress
17. Jbid., Ser. 4, TIT, p. 919.
18. Ibid., Ser. 4, III, pp. 919-20.
19* John Adams, The Ad ams Parers: Piany and A^tobiorraphy
of John Adams, T. X; mho Diary of Adams 1771 781,
ed, L. H. Butterfield, (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard
University Press, 1961), p. 197.
20. National Archives, Parers of the Continental Congress 
1774-1?8o„ Tran script Journals, reel 15.
15
was given a free hand ”since it is the opinion of the
CCont inentalj Congress, that the work should by no means
be neglected.” The suggestion was also made that Viest
Point and Popolopen Creek be investigated as sites for
small, harassing batteries of heavy cannon. It was
recommended that an intelligence and warning system be
established, that some means of obstructing the river be
built, and that New Jersey and Connecticut be consulted
for assistance. Brigadier General Wooster was also
instructed to provide the requested troops unless he had
received orders to the contrary from Major General Philip
21
Schuyler, then commanding the Northern Department. 'J* Adams 
reported that James Duane was responsible for the instruc­
tions concerning Wooster and John Rutledge for the proposal
22to construct a boom.
Yet another controversy erupted at Port Constitution 
on 15 October. Commissioners Bayard and Bedlow had started 
requiring vessels passing the works to sho\^  their politics 
by dipping their sails in salute to the flag. On 15 October 
Captain Robert North refused to dip his sloop*s sail, even 
when threatened with being fired upon by the fort. A 
party of armed men boarded the sloop and were greeted by an 
incensed North. They were informed that North had a pair 
of pistols and
21. Ibid.. reel 15.
22. Adams, Diaryf p. 199*
i 6
if that damned rascal, Caotain Bayard, did not 
produce an order to him from the L'New York]
Provincial Congress, for the request..., he 
would blow his brains opt; with many more
unfriendly expressions.
Both North and the Commissioners referred the matter to
24the New York Congress. Wisdom prevailed, and on 19
October instructions were dispatched to the Commissioners
to leave the shipping alone unless they had a very good
2 *5reason to suspect someone.
In response to the Continental Congress* instructions
to investigate the other possible sites, the Mew York
Congress communicated with the Commissioners and Romans.
On 16 October both reported. Romans stated that he could
not give an estimate for the site at Popolopen Creek, but
that work on Fort Constitution was progressing well and
cannon were being mounted. He did consider Popolopen
Creek a good site, but West Point he felt was “at present,
26to me entirely useless."
On 17 October the New York Congress considered that
the works were far enough along to require a garrision.
They requested four artillery companies be raised im-
27mediately to man the works. The Continental Congress 
replied on 28 October authorizing one company to be raised 
immediately.  ^' This company was recruited in New York
28* Force. American Archives, Ser. 4 , III, P. 1293*
24
25
26
27
28
Ibid
Ibid
X h id
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City by Captain John Lamb. On 3 November, two .incom­
plete Continental infantry companies were ordered to 
the Highlands by the New York Congress. These, were 
Captain John Grennell’s comp,any of the Second New York 
and Captain Benjamin Ledyard1s company of the First New 
Yor*.29
A New York request for appointment of a commandant 
was received on 6 November by the Continental Congress. 
Robert Livingston and four others were selected to consider 
this letter, and they reported on 8 November. It was 
resolved to appoint a colonel to command the Highlands as 
a separate entity. The New York Congress was also au­
thorized to organize militia to defend the posts until 
Continentals could take over. This resolution additionally 
authorized the establishment of a supply depot in the High­
lands. Robert R. Livingston, Robert T. Paine, and -John
Langdon were instructed to inspect the Highlands on their
qo
way north to confer with Major General Schuyler. ~ The
election of a commander was postponed on 9 November,
Captain John Hanson being appointed temporary commander
81until the colonel should be elected. The matter was 
left at that, however. On 10 November Colonel William 
Alexander, better known as Lord Stirling, was instructed 
to send six companies of New Jersey Continentals to the
A p
Highlands*'**" There is no record that they ever reported,
29. Force, American Archives, Ser. k, TII, p. 1323*
30. Paoers of the Continental Congress, reel 15*
31- Ibid.. reel 15* 32. Ibid.. reel 15*
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While this effort to obtain a garrison was going on, 
Romans was becoming a source of antagonism to the Com­
missioners* They quibbled over cost estimates., for a second 
blockhouse following the completion of the first. Romans' 
plans were being completed, but problems were arising with 
the civilian workers. On 15 November Romans wrote the Com­
missioners claiming that they were responsible for stirring 
up the workers.
On 17 November the committee from the Continental. 
Congress arrived at Fort Constitution on their inspection 
tour. Their report, dated 23 November, was highly critical. 
While they found a garrison of approximately one hundred 
men from the two New York companies, a considerable force 
of civilian workmen, plenty of cannon, shot, and gunpowder, 
they had reservations.
We must own that we found the fort in a less 
defensible situation than we had reason to 
expect, owing chiefly to an injudicious dispo­
sition of the labour.... The fortress is un­
fortunately commanded by all the grounds about 
it, and much exposed to an attack by land.
They especially pointed out that West Point dominated the
island, and that Fort Constitution was overly ambitious.
To improve the poor positioning of Romans* battery would
be very expensive in their opinion. They mentioned that
they had been informed that Popolopen Creek was a promising
site, and suggested that qualified experts be sent to
survey the area as soon as possible.
33. Force, American Archives, Ser. III, op. 13*59-67•
3*4-. Ibid., Ser. "Tig III, pp. 1657-8.
19
The New York Congress subsequently dispatched a com­
mittee to investigate* the second site. The members, Isaac 
Nicoll, Thomas Palmer, and Gilbert Drake, recommended that 
the primary defensive effort be shifted to the Popolopen 
Creek site. This committee also attempted to resolve the 
dispute between the Commissioners and Romans. Their In­
quiry reached the conclusion that Remans was claiming too 
much power.
The final important decision of 1775 relating to the 
Hudson Highlands was taken on 13 December. On that date the 
Continental Congress resolved to construct thirteen ships 
of war. Two of these ships were to be built in New York 
with a target date for completion of 31 Narch 1776.
Peekskill was to be the construction site for these ships, 
one to be a frigate of twenty-eight guns and the other a 
frigate of twenty-four.
As the year drew to an end the crucial decision on 
the location of the principle defensive work had been 
made. Hereafter, Port Constitution, after the great expense 
in resources and time, was to be relegated to a secondary 
role. Popolopen Creek, which was to play the critical role 
in the Campaign of 1777, had been decided upon, although 
construction had not yet commenced. The critical problem 
of unified control was not yet settled.
35. George Clinton, Public Pacers of Georre Clinton,
(10 vols.; Albany: State of New York, 189971 I, 
p. 132.
36. Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 15.
CHAPTER III 
1776
The new year began with a final inquiry into the
shifting of emphasis from Constitution Island to Pcpo-
lopen Creek. On 3 January Pierre Van Courtlandt wrote
to the Continental Congress for the New York Committee
of Safety. In his letter he summarized the arguments put
forth by Romans for Constitution Island and Thomas Palmer
for* the investigating committee. Van Courtlandt stated
that the Committee of Safety was of the opinion that
Palmer was correct in his estimate that Popolopen Creek
would be both cheaper and a better defensive position*"
Before this letter arrived, Thomas Palmer and Richard
Greene 11 reached the Continental Congress on 5 January*4'
The Congress resolved, after questioning them,
That no further fortifications ought to be 
erected at Martler's rock on Hudsons river, 
and that a point of land at PuplopenJs kill 
on the said river ought without delay to be 
effectually fortified.
The New York Congress was authorized to carry out this 
q
resolution. On 13 January Van Courtlandt*s letter
1« Will I am t5 e 11 Cl ark, e d ., Naval Documents of the American 
Revolution. (^- vols.; Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 196t- ), III, pp. 587-~8„
2* Ibid., III, p. 636. 3* National Archives, Parers of
th >"-■ C o^ 11 j n on tal C on yr e s s 17?b-1. ?8Q , Transcript Journals, 
reel ly*
20
21
arrived along with Romans, who was examined.^ The final
resolution did not come until 15 February* At this date it
was decided that while no new works should be erected at
Fort Constitution, those already begun should be finished
and garrisoned* The new fort at Popolopen Creek should not
mount over forty cannon and be constructed of earth and
fascines. Such Continental troops that might be stationed
there were authorized to assist in the construction under
*5
the direction of the engineers.
The command structure for the Highlands was tenta­
tively organized in the early months of the year. On 16 
January Colonel Isaac Nicoll of the New York militia was 
placed in command of the Highlands by the New York Congress. 
At the same time Captain William Smith was appointed as the 
engineer for the new fort. Construction was begun on the 
modest new fort in February under Smith1s direction. De­
signed to mount fifteen guns, five of them heavy thirty-two 
pounders, it was named for 1 the brave Gen Montgomery” who
7
had been killed, in the attack on Quebec.
At this same time the Continental Army staff was be­
ginning to realize that New York City would be the target of 
the 1776 campaign. Flavor General Charles Lee, sent by 
Washington to inspect New York City, was the first to be
Ibid.. reel 15. 5* Ibid. . reel 15.
6. George Clinton, Public Papers of_George Clinton. (10 
vcls.; Albany: State of New York, 1899), I, P. 132.
7. William Smith * s “A Plan of Fort Montgomery" reproduced 
in Peter J. Guthorn, American Maps and Far Fakers of 
the Revolution, (Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau 
Press, ipbbTT"P* 33*
aware of the strategic importance of the Highlands, On 
5 February he wrote to Washington advising him that the 
Highlands passes should be put in a defensible state and 
guarded by a battalion, Washington responded on ^ May by 
ordering Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Livingston of the 
Third New York to move five of his companies to the forts
Q
and assume command if he was not outranked, A subsequent
letter dated 8 May was sent to the New York Congress thanking
them for their efforts and advising them that Colonel Nicoll
10would be relieved whenever Livingston arrived. Nicoll 
obstinately refused to leave Fort Constitution until 8 June, 
Washington had moved the Continental Arm?/ down to New 
York City by this time, In May he dispatched the recently 
promoted Brigadier General Stirling to survey the state of 
the Highlands. Stirling1s report, dated 1 June, enclosed 
reports from Nicoll on the status of Fort Constitution and 
Livingston on Fort Montgomery. On his examination tour 
he was accompanied by Colonel Rufus Putnam, the army1s
8. Lee to Washington 5 Feb. 1776; Jared Sparks, ed. ,• Corres­
pondence of the Arne rlcar. Revolution, (k vo 1 s . ; Bos ton:
Little, Brown, 1853), I, pi f£TlT~
9. Washington to Henry Livingston A May 1776; George Washing
ton, Writings of Oeorme Washington, ed. by John C. Fitz­
patrick, (39 vols, ; Washington: Government Print:?ng Of­
fice, 1931)? V, pp. 10-11. (Hereafter referred to as 
Fitzpatrick.) 10. Pacers of the Secret
Committee of the New York Provincial Congress, Washing­
ton's Headquarters Historic Site, Newburgh, H .Y. (Photo­
static Copies at the United States Military Academy).
11. Peter Force, ed., A~erican Archives: A Collection of 
Authentic Records, State Papers. Debates, end. Letters 
anri Other -tqtj ces of Public Affairs , (9 vols.; washington 
M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-1853), Series 
b, vi, p. 510.
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chief engineer, and Captain-Lieutenant Win.throp Sergeant, 
an artillery officer. They stated that both forts had a 
large quantitiy of cannon, shot, and powder, bpt that both 
garrisons were small. Each had a company of the Third New 
York and two companies of militia. Furthermore, according 
to the returns, most of the ordnance was of relatively 
small caliber. The sloop Li berty« Captain Henry Palmer, 
was employed by the Commissioners to provide communications 
between the two forts. Copies of the expense records 
for May included in the report Indicated approximately
-i 2
£'+50 were being expended each month.
Washington, confessing that he was unacquainted with 
the Highlands, submitted recommendations on improvements 
to the Commissioners on 10 June. These recommendations had 
been submitted to him by Stirling upon his return to New 
York City. For Fort Constitution, he recommended that the 
works be enclosed to make it less liable to capture by a 
sudden attack. At this time the nature of the fortress 
was more properly that of an extended battery, rather than 
a regular enclosed fort. Relying on an extensive marsh to 
protect its flank, it was exposed to attack from the rear.
Fort Montgomery he found in a much better state. All he 
advised there was that the planned works be completed. He 
and Colonel Putnam did notice one flaw,
12. Stirling to Washington 1 Jure 1776; Library of Congress,
George Wash in g ton Pacers , ( Pr e s i den t- i al Paper s M i cr of I lm s, 
196l7, Series^, reel 36.
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I would also advertise that the Hill on the op­
posite rsouthj Side of the Creek, & the Mouth 
thereof, be cleared in such a Manner, that an 
Engineer can lav out a proper regular Work on 
it, if hereafter be found necessary,^3
Washington now began to recognize the vital importance
of the Highlands, and established a unified command of the
Continental Army there. On 14 June he ordered Colonel
James Clinton to report to the Highlands with his regiment
(the Second Mew York) and relieve Lieutenant Colonel
Livingston. He was also to relieve the Commissioners and
assume overall command of the area.
As these are or may become Posts of' infinite 
Importance, especially the lower one [Port 
Montgomery^; I cannot Sufficiently impress 
upon you the Necessity of putting them jlnto a 
fit Posture of Defense, without Delay.-4
The New York Congress dismissed the Commissioners on the
same day, with a reprimand to Captain Jonathan Lawrence for
1storing tea, "that useless herb," at Port Constitution*' v
On 12 July the British made their first penetration of 
the Hudson Hi ver. On that day two British warships, the 
frigates Phoenix (Captain Hyde Parker, forty-five guns) and 
Rose (Captain James Wallace, thirty-two guns), with some 
tenders sailed past the fortifications on Manhattan Island 
and penetrated to the Tappan Zee. They were guided from 
the anchorage at Staten Island by Robert Sneden, a New
-j £
Jersey loyalist. A deserter subsequently reported that
i.3. Ibid*. Ser. 3E, reel 16, vol. I, pp. 324-7.
14. Fitzpatrick, V, pp. 139-9*
15. Livingston to Stirling 11 June 1776; Force, American
Arr»M res , Ser. A , VI, p. 1 405*
16. Adr1an C. Lei by, Revolutionary War in the Hackensack
Valley, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 
19 o 2), p . 44•
their mission was to destroy the two Continental frigates
1 7being built at Poughkeepsie. Washington immediately wrote
to Brigadier General George Clinton requesting^that he call
18out his brigade of Orange and Ulster County militia.
George Clinton was James Clinton's younger brother, and
both were distant cousins of Lieutenant General Sir Henry
Clinton, the British second-in-command. A letter was also
sent to the New York Congress suggesting that fireships
1 bbe prepared to destroy the British vessels. '
The militia mobilized, and manned the forts and both
banks of the river between the Highlands and New York City.
Although Washington had anticipated two thousand militia,
?o
only nine hundred were actually on duty at any one time.
On 14 July George Clinton assumed command of Fort Constitu­
tion. He recommended to the Committee of Safety that they
purchase old sloops to use as fireships. He also requested
21two row-galleys and a whaleboat for reconnaissance.
Washington suspected that the British ships were on a 
mission to sieze the Highlands, or were going; to distribute
17. Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington 27 July 1776; 
Joshua and Jedediah Huntington, "Huntington Papers: 
Correspondence of the Brothers Joshua and Jedediah 
Huntington During the Period of the American Revolution 
1771 *“1783," Connecticut Historical Society Collections . 
XX (1927), p. 715- 18. Washington to George Clinton
12 .July 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 265.
19. Washington to New York Congress 12 July 1776; "Papers 
of the Secret Committee."
20. Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the 
Middle States During the War for Independence 1775-1781 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan 
1936), 'Appendix A.
21. G. Clinton to New York Committee of Safety 14 July 1776 
Clinton, Pu.bl.ic Papers. I, pp. 249-50.
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arms to the New York loyalists, touching off an uprising in 
22his rear. “ While the channel in the Tappan Zee limited
their effectiveness as raiders, it also kept the ships out
of the range of shore batteries. To dislodge the ships
Washington requested Governors Trumbull of Connecticut and
Cooke of Rhode Island to send several of their states*
2 7row^-gallies to the river. While these defences were 
being prepared, the ships maneuvered in the river without 
doing anything of consequence. On 16 July fourteen fire­
ships were readied at Poughkeepsie, but they were not
24launched at that time. This lack of action produced
25
considerable annoyance among the militia.
The hastily assembled American flotilla of five armed 
26gallies ” left its anchorage at Spuyten Duyvil Creek, the 
north end of Manhattan Island, on 3 August. They moved 
upriver and engaged the frigates for two hours under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Tupper. After scoring 
several hits on the Phoenix, damage sustained by all the 
gallies forced them to retire to Manhattan. ' Washington.
22. Vla.shin.gton to Congress 14 July 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 275*
23. Washington to Trumbull, to Cooke 15 July 1776; Ibid..
V, 00. 2.82-3. 24. Jacobus Van Zandt to G.
Clinton 16 July 1776; Clinton, Public Parers. I, 00. 2.54-5,
25. Colonel Isaac Nicoll to G. Clinton 20 JulvT??6; Ibid. ,
I, pp. 263-4. 26. The Washington, the flagship;
the L ady W a. oh 1 r r-1 or : the Spitfire; the Shark :' and the 
V/hi ting. Sharlr and Whi tinm were from Connecticut,
Washi noton and Srd tf^  re from Rhode Island.
27* Tupper to Washington 3 August 1776; Force, American 
Archives. Ser. 5, I, PP» 766-7. Another eyewitness 
report is enclosed in Greene to Washington 8 August 
1776, Ibid,, Ser. 5, I, p. 751* Lack of training as 
a squadron seems to have hampered, its effective use.
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referred to this as “a Smart engagement” and commended
everyone involved, but apparently realized that it was 
28inconclusive,
A second attempt on the frigates was made on the night
of 16 August. This time two fireships were launched from
Peekskill. They were carried down by the current and failed
to destroy either of the warships, although they grappled
2Q
with the Rose for ten minutes. " One tender was destroyed,
and the British apparently considered this a sufficient threat
and took advantage of a favorable wind to run back past
80Manhattan Island and rejoin the fleet. Washington or­
dered a bounty of $50 to be paid to each man on the fire­
ships who was burned and $L0 to the others in an unusual
31recognition of their bravery.^
This raid, while accomplishing very little for the
British, stimulated considerable American concern for the
Highlands. The ease with which the British ships had
penetrated the obstacles at Manhattan increased awareness
of the necessity for sealing the passage in the Highlands.
Washington bolstered the Continental forces at the forts
by ordering Second Lieutenant Thomas Machin of Colonel
Henry Knox's Artillery Regiment to the Highlands on 21 
32July. Machin was to serve Colonel James Clinton as an
28. Washington to Cooke 5 August 1776; Fitzpatrick, V, p. 373-
2-9* Washington to Congress 1? August 1776; Ibid. . V, p. .
30. Washington to Congress 18 August 1776; Ibid . , V, p. *152.
31, General Order for 18 August 1776; V/ ash in gt on Parer s f
Ser. reel 26. 32. Washington to Machin 21
July 1776; Washington to George Clinton 21 July 1776; 
Fitzpatrick, V, p. 319.
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engineer, and in the event of an attack could do double 
duty in assisting with the artillery. The disastrous 
defeat on Long Island on 2? August necessitated the con­
centration of Continentals for the defense of New York 
City. Six hundred militia were called out as a means of 
providing manpower to hasten the completion of the forts, 
and an average of two hundred were at work every day for 
two non th s. ^
The New York Committee of Safety debated the best 
means for obstructing the river at Port Montgomery, and 
eventually decided to stretch a chain across to Anthony's 
Nose. For this purpose they wrote to Major General Philip 
Schuyler requesting the chain which had been captured the 
previous year at Sorel in Canada.- To protect the frigates 
and supply depot at Fishkill a small earthwork was con­
structed by Machin at Red Hook, on the northern edge of 
Peekskill Pay. Subsequently named Fort Independence, its 
garrison consisted of three companies of militia. A small 
detachment of Continentals provided guards for the stores 
themselves. Stirling's recommendation that the south 
side of Popolopen Creek be fortified was also acted upon,
and by 8 September the first cannon were mounted by James 
3 0Clinton.^'' This new fort, soon to surpass the original
33 • Jameson, "Militia of the Middle St rites," Appendix A*
3k, Robert Yates to Schuyler C29 July l?76j; Papers of the
Secret Committee,
35. Emma L. Patterson, Peekskill in the American Revolution. 
(Peekskill, N.Y.: Friendly Town Association, 19^), P • 17
36. James Clinton to G. Clinton 8 Sep. 1775; Clinton, Publ1c 
Papers. I, p. 337.
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Fort Montgomery, was named Fort Clinton, apparently after
one of the brothers.
While James Clinton reported to the New York Congress*■*
that work was progressing well in September, he did com­
plain that he needed more men, nails, and good food. He 
especially felt that the current total force of ?6^ men, 
only five companies of which were Continentals of the
Second New York, was about one thousand men less than 
37necessary. 1 Washington also urged the New York Congress
to take "the utmost attention and every exertion" to
secure the forts. The Continental Congress determined
on 23 September that the Highlands required a larger
garrison and directed Washington to station a full battal-
39ion of regulars there. y
Lieutenant General Sir William! Howe had shaken his 
army into action and landed at Kip's Bay on Manhattan on 
15 September, but his advance had ground to a halt in the 
skirmish the next day at Harlem Heights. While he pon­
dered his next move he dispatched at second naval expedi­
tion up the river. At 9:15 AM on 9 October the frigates 
Phoenix. Roebuck (Captain Andrew Snape Hamond, forty-four 
guns), and Tartar (Captain Cornwaithe Ommanney, twenty-eight 
guns), together with the schooner Trya] and two tenders ran 
past the ineffectual Forts Washington and Lee. The only
37. Force, American Arch 1 vas. Ser. 5> PP» 670-2.
38. Washington to New York Congress 12 Sep. 1776; Fitz­
patrick, VI, p.
39* Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 16.
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American vessels in the vicinity wisely realized that they
were overmatched and attempted to flee upriver. The swifter
British ran two large ships ashore at Yonkers ,§md destroyed
one of them. They also sank a sloop which was carrying
David Bushnell's submarine) the Turtle. and captured a
40merchant schooner and two row-galleys. These galleys
were the Crane and Independence. the former a veteran of the 
4-1earlier raid. The British ships remained anchored at
Dobbs Perry for the entire course of the campaign through
Westchester County, leading Washington to recognize that
they were being used to disrupt his communications to New 
42Jersey. This increased the importance of Kings Perry 
which now became the shortest route available to the 
Americans.
The militia turned out to meet this threat as they had
for the previous one, and saw as little action. Major
General William Heath dispatched five hundred Continentals
and three artillery pieces to stiffen the militia, but the
majority returned from Dobbs Perry when they realized
4 1that the British were not on an active raid. ^ On 12 
October Howe landed on Throgfs Neck in Westchester to
40. Wil 1 iam Heath, Memoirs of Pajo*»-Crereral Wi11 j am ueath 
By Himself, ed. by Wi 11 iam Abba11, ( New York: V/111 iam 
Abbatt, 1901; New York: Arno Press, 1968), pp. 60-2.
41. Ebenezer Huntington to Andrew Huntingon 11 Oct. 1776; 
Ehenozer Hunt ^ n^ton Letters Wr^ tie'0 bv Eha-*'-1^ r er
Huntington Duri'r’rr th0 Ameri ccan devolution, (New York: 
For C. P. -Teartman, 19l4)"", p. ”497
42. Washington to Congress 11 Oct. 1776; Fitzpatrick, VI, 
p. 196.
43. Heath, Memoirs. pp. 61-2.
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begin his attempted envelopment of Washington*s army. This
same day the Secret Committee of the New York Congress wrote
to Washington requesting that a "good" regiment and a "good"
engineer be sent to secure the Highlands passes to prevent
kk
a loyalist uprising.
Events in Westchester rapidly worsened. After being 
thwarted at Throg* s Neck, Howe shifted further east and 
on IB October landed at Pell1s Point. Despite a sharp en­
gagement with a brigade under Colonel John Glover at East- 
Chester shortly after landing, the British army ground 
relentlessly toward White Plains. Washington retired to 
the Croton River after an inconclusive battle at White 
Plains on 28 October. In a council of war on 6 November, 
attended by the general officers of the army, it was decided 
to divide the Continentals into four parts to allow a 
flexible posture. A garrison was to be left at Fort 
Washington to preserve a last foothold on Manhattan. A 
further three thousand men were to be stationed "at Peeks­
kill and the passes in the Highlands for the defence of 
those Posts £,3 erecting Fortifications &c." The flexibil­
ity was to be achieved by leaving Major General Charles Lee, 
the second-in-command, on the eastern side of the river with 
the regiments recruited from New England while Washington 
moved to the west side with the remainder. The provision 
was made that Lee should rejoin the main army if circumstances
44. Robert R. Livingston to Washington 12 Oct. 1776;
Sparks, Correspondence. I, pp. 295-6.
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b- 6so dictated, " This last point was repeated in Washington's
orders to Lee leaving him in charge of the troops left on
the east side.^^
This arrangement of forces provided a great degree of
flexibility, especially since Howe's next objective was
unclear. In fact the only inherent weakness was the con-
A7mitment of a large garrison to Port Washington. 1 Howe 
rapidly recognized this and on 16 November captured the 
fort with its awkward garrison. This resounding disaster 
exposed Washington to being chased through New Jersey, but 
it was also "the lesson that made him sophisticated on the
UQ
subject of forts.11' Hereafter, he would never construct, 
works too extensive to be properly garrisoned or as poorly 
situated. This lesson would be embodied In the Highlands 
in 1?78,
The garrison, commander selected for the Highlands was
the Massachusetts-born Major General William Heath, the
sixth ranking general in the Continental Army. He was
La
ordered, to report to Peekskill with his division'y on 8
<0November and arrived two days later.v Washington personally
L5. "Minutes of the Continental Councils of War," 6 Nov.
1776; W a s h i n or t on Pa Derg. Ser. JF 9 reel 25.
*4-6. Washington to Lee 10 Nov. 1776; Fitzpatrick, VI, pp. 263-5.
47. James T. Flexrer, Oeorpre Washington in the American
Revolution, (Boston; L1111 e, i~§?PT) , pp. 17-4-3”*
*t-8. Ibid. , p. 152. ^9. In the Continental Army the
organization of divisions and brigades was far more flex­
ible than in World War II. Just as is currently the prac­
tice in Vietnam, battalions and regiments were shifted 
from one major unit to another with high frequency. While 
this is a headache for the historian, it allowed a great 
deal of flexibility to meet strategic and tactical needs. 
50, Heath, Memoirs. p. 75•
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inspected the Highlands for the first time on 11 November 
while the army was crossing at Kings Ferry. On this inspec­
tion tour he was accompanied by Heath, Stirling, the Clinton 
brothers, Colonel Putnam, and Brigadier General Thomas Mif­
flin. At this time he noted that West Point should be 
fortified. Washington crossed into New Jersey on 12 Novem­
ber leaving Heath in command of the troops and posts in the 
Highlands. Washington stressed the importance of these 
fortifications and implored Heath to do his best to secure 
them.-51
Heath promptly distributed his troops to protect both 
sides of the river. James Clinton's Second New York Regi­
ment continued at the forts. Two regiments of Brigadier 
General Samuel Holden Parsons' brigade were sent to guard 
the Clove on the west bank while the remaining three, together 
with Brigadier General John Morin Scott's brigade of three 
regiments, covered the eastern passes. Brigadier General 
George Clinton's militia brigade remained at Peekskill as 
a reserve force."'
Returns for lk- November indicate that the garrison of 
Forts Montgomery and Clinton numbered 1131, s.nd that of Fort 
Constitution 388. It must be noted that the numbers of 
Continentals were a mere 222 and 161 respectively*-'-' The 
terms of enlistment of most of these men ended on 1 January
51* Ibid., p. ?6. The actual order to Heath is in Fitz­
patrick, VI, p. 9. 52, Heath, Memoirs. pp. 76-?*
53* Force, Ameri can Archives f Ser. 5, III, pp. 679-80.
1?77* Lee*s force of three divisions was concentrated at 
North Castle* On 16 November it numbered 10,768 men in 
twenty-five regiments, but had a total effective strength 
of only 5,162.
On 20 November the British struck out swiftly to in­
vade New Jersey, forcing the evacuation of Fort Lee. As 
Washington retreated towards Philadelphia he wrote to Lee 
to rejoin the army as soon as possible. Lee was requested 
to leave behind only those men whose service would expire 
very shortly. This letter was carried by a cavalryman 
who also bore a verbal message which was'reported to Heath. 
The conflicting interpretations of this order by the two 
generals resulted in the most bitter quarrel, and the nest 
important, which had yet occurred in the Highlands.
Lee considered his force to be a command independent
t0
of W a s h i n g t o n . H e  acknowledged receipt of Washington1s
order, which he called "a Recommendation not a positive
order," by writing to Heath. Lee requested that Heath,
since he was closer to Washington, send a force of two
thousand of his own men across the river, inform Washington
and await further orders. Lee promised to renla.ee them as
<8soon as he finished "a necessary Jobb."y Heath, who had 
been informed by Washington *s courier that the troops were
5;t. Ibid. , Ser. 5, III, p. 710.
55- Fitzpatrick, VI, pp. 298-300.
56. Heath, rs. p. 79* 57* Lee to James Powdoin
21 Nov, 1776; Chanles Lee, "Lee Papers: Vol. II, 
1776-1778,1 New Ycrk Historical Society Collections.
V (1872), p p . 201-2.
58. Lee to Heath 21 Nov. 1776; Ibid. , V, p. 291.
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to come from Lee's force and not his own, refused.- In 
his letter to Lee, Heath stressed that it would take him 
as long to collect the two thousand men as it would for 
Lee to reach Kings Perry, and that he had positive instruc­
tions from Washington, which he quoted, not to weaken his
. . .  60position.
Lee's "Jobb" involved the attempt to destroy Major
Robert Rogers' loyalist force, the Queen's Rangers, then
61forming In Westchester. Ke further procrastinated by
ordering Brigadier General John Nixon to break his brigade
6 2into small parties to forage. The next day, 23 November, 
he wrote to Heath chastising him for interpreting Washington's 
orders as being so binding that he could not break a "tittle" 
to save an army. Lee informed Heath that while he was 
sending Glover's brigade to Peekskill to cover the passes, 
Heath should have two thousand men ready to march on the 
twenty-fifth.^
Heath replied on 2*4- November that if he complied he
would be left with a mere 328 men for the forts since the
militia's and Scott's brigade's enlistments would all be 
up In ten days. He stated that he would send the men 
without Washington's orders if he felt Washington wanted 
them, but since he knew Washington did not, he would not
59* Heath, Memoirs. pp. 80-1.
60. Heath to Lee 10 PM 21 Nov. 1776; Lee, "Lee Pacers,"
V, pr>. 200-100.
61. Lee to Joseph Reed 2k Nov. 17?*; Ibid., V, p. 206.
62. Lee to Nixon 22 Nov. 1776; Ibid.t V, pp. 301-2.
63. Lee to Heath 23 Nov. 1776; Ibid., V, p. 30k.
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64order his troops to march. Heath then sent a dispatch to
Washington informing, him of the state of affairs and reques-
6 6ting advice as soon as possible. v This advice reached
him on the twenty-sixth reaffirming that the troops should
come from Lee's force, not Heath1s . ^
Lee responded very sarcastically to Heath on 26
November, accusing Heath of believing himself to be as
independent as if he were at the Straits of Magellan. Then
Lee 1 pul led rank” and claimed as Heath's superior the right
to issue orders to Heath. If anything should happen to
Washington because these troops did not arrive in time, Lee
67claimed, Heath would be responsible. ■ Lee also wrote to 
Washington on that same day denying that it was his intention 
to strip the Highlands. All he proposed to do was shift 
Heath's men to New Jersey and replace them from his own 
force. There was no risk involved in this maneuver in Lee's 
estimation.
The matter finally came to a head when the two generals 
confronted each other on 30 November at Peekskill. When 
Heath refused to send one man under his orders, Lee certified 
in writing that he had assumed command of the Highlands.
He then ordered two regiments, the Seventh and Twenty-first 
Continental Infantry, to be prepared to march in the morning
64. Heath to Lee 24 Nov. 17?6; Ibid.. V, p. 305.
65. Heath to Washington 24 Nov. 1776; Heath, Memoir, pp. 82-3.
66. Robert H. Harrison (for Washington) to Heath 25 Nov.
1776; Ibid.f p. 84.
67. Lee to Heath 26 Nov. 1776; Lee, "Lee Papers," V, pp. 313-4,
68. Lee to. Washington 26 Nov. 1776; Ibid.. V, p. 315*
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6o
from Continental Village, the barracks area near Peekskill. '
Lee also wrote to Washington informing him that he was
marching to New Jersey. In this letter he blamed any delay
•70and reduction in the number of troops on Heath.' To 
Heath's amazement, Lee countermanded these orders on 1 
December. That same day Scot's brigade's enlistments ex­
pired and only fifty men reenlisted. Lee's force crossed
Kings Ferry from 1 to 3 December, leaving trails of blood
71in the snow because so many men were shoeless.
Lee considered Heath sadly misguided, writing to
Major General Joseph Spencer that Heath was "confident
that all the movements of the Enemy in every part of the
continent are only feints, that they only mean to weaken
72him, and that when He is taken all is lost."' Heath was 
actually more aware of the vital importance of the Highlands, 
and wisely refused to be a party to Lee's attempts at self- 
g]crifieation. Heath recognized, that the maintenance of an 
army~in~beirg under Washington was of primary importance, 
bi -1 t c a* c t^1 p r w ^ th the Commander—in—Chief realized that con­
trol of the Hj. ghlands formed an independent department from 
the field armies, and fell directly under the control of 
Washington.
Lee failed to join Washington. He chose to remain
69. Heath, Memoirs. pp. 86-7* The statement is also found 
in Lee, "Lee Pacers,1 V, p. 376.
70. Lee to Washington 70 Nov. 1776; Lee, "Lee Papers,"
V, pp. 322-7/
71. Heath, Memoirs. p. 88.
72. Lee to Snencer 2 Dec. 1776; Lee, "Lee Pacers," V, 
p. 328.
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with M r force in the hills of New Jersey around Norristown.
where he posed a real threat to the British lines of
communications• While this policy was to cause Washington
some real problems at the time, he quickly realized its
73advantages and adopted it in subsequent campaigns*  ^ Lee
himself was captured by the British at Basking Ridge, New
Jersey, on 13 December*
On 9 December Washington requested Heath to march with
Parsons8 Connecticut Continental brigade on a raid into
New Jersey to relieve some of the pressure on the rapidly
7J4,
disintegrating main army.' Heath moved the brigade to 
Kings Ferry on the next day and entered New Jersey on the 
eleventh.  ^ The three regiments of the brigade were accom­
panied by a field piece and a howitzer, the standard 
proportion of artillery in the Continental Arm:/. Colonel
Isaac Nicoll was left in charge at Peekskill during Heath8s 
?6absence. " Heath chose as his target a loyalist regiment
supposedly at Hackensack. The attempted surprise on Id
December netted, negligable results as the loyalists had
changed encampments, and a second attempt on 18 December at
Bergen was only slightly more effective. The troops re-
77
turned, to the Highlands on 23 December. ‘ '
In spite of all these movements and distractions
73. Flexner, Vfa.shington in the Revo 1 ut.ion. p. 165.
7d. Washington to Heath 9 Dec. 1776; Fitzpatrick, VI, p. 335*
75* Heath, Memo!r. p. 90. 76. Orderly Book of Norris
Graham*s Regiment of Orange County Militia, New York 
(City) Public Library Manuscripts Division, (photostat 
of original in private collection).
77. Heath, Memoirs. pp. 91-d.
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construction continued on the Highlands defenses. The New
York Congress employed a Captain Hazelwood from Pennsylvania
as an advisor on obstructing the river. In anticipation of
the arrival of the chain from Schuyler on 3 November, Captain-
Lieutenant Machin prepared for Installation at Forts Clinton
and Montgomery« The chain was to be supported by rafts
79of pointed logs. Machin frantically worked to get the 
chain emplaced, following the scare occasioned by the fall 
of Forts Washington and Lee. However, the chain broke twice. 
An inquiry was held, but sworn affidavits from James Clinton, 
Captain Abram Swartwout, Captain James Rosekrans, and Lieu­
tenant Daniel Lawrence revealed that it was due to specific
3 0faulty parts and not to the overall construction. Machin 
reported that he could make modifications and _ place the
8i
chain properly in the spring.
In the interim it was judged necessary by the Committee
of Safety to emplace some obstacle. On 26 November Robert
Livingston conferred with Heath and George Clinton, and it
was decided to emplace chevaux-de~frise at Polopel Island
82just above the Highlands. George Clinton was dispatched 
with two regiments (five hundred men) to garrison Fort 
Constitution and construct the chevaux. He arrived on 30
78. Minutes of the Secret Committee, lA Oct. 1776. Also
John McKesson to George Clinton 31 Oct. 1.776; Clinton, 
Pnbl1c Parers« I, p. bob.
7 9 * 8). M. Putt or her, Ohs truct ions to the Nay i gat 1. on of
Hud roe 1 s ( Al'reny: *'i'r.sell, I860"), p. 6 4 .
80. Force, A?°ric?.n ftrr.hlvos. Ser. 5, III, lUO.
8 1 . Ser. % ' l T T ,  op. 838-9 .
82. T M 3 .. Ser. 5, III, pp. 338-9.
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November and. began work the next day, ^ In addition, the
two Continental frigates, the Conrress (Captain Tudor, de-
si gened for twenty-eight guns) and the Montgomery (Captain
Lawrence, twenty-four) were ordered from Peekskill to
Kingston*s Roundout Creek for protection while they were
81being finished.
In the closing days of 1776 the Highlands were recog­
nized to be of great strategic importance.
If the ^British] persevere in their plan of sub­
jugating these States to the Yoke of Great Bri­
tain, they must, in proportion to their knowledge 
of the country, be more and more convinced of the 
necessity of their becoming masters of the Hudson*s 
River, which will give them the entire command of 
the water Comm mi cat Ion with the Indian nations, 
effectively prevert ai! 1 ints^cours ° between the 
Eastern end Southern Confederates, divide our 
strength, and enfeeble every effort for our com­
mon preservation and security,
The Commander-in-Chief had become presonally convinced of this 
fact, and saw to it that the works were vigorously carried 
out. He was to acquire from the events of November and Decem­
ber not only an appreciation of the use of the greater High­
lands range, of which the Morristown hills form a part, as 
a base of operations, but also as a base for raids against 
British outposts.
83* George Clinton to New York Congress 1 Dec. 1776;
Clinton, Publi c Parers, I, p . 110.
81, Force, American Archives, Ser. 5, III, p. 330•_
8^. New York Congress to Continental Congress 28 [Nov7)
177b; Ibid., Ser. 5, III, pp. 331-1.
CHAPTER TV 
BRITISH PLANNING FOR THE 1?7? CAMPAIGN
The British ministry had. not forgotten the lessons on 
the importance of the Hudson River learned so painfully 
during the Colonial Wars. As early as 12 June 1775 it was 
suggested that British forces sieze New York City and oper­
ate south from Lake Champlain.1 Admiral Lord Howe wrote 
to Lord George Germain on 25 September 1775 stressing the 
need to shift the center of the war from Boston to New York
City, and also suggested that a secondary force operate
2from Canada as far as Crown Point on Lake Champlain.
These suggestions were adopted in 1??6. Sir William 
Howe evacuated Boston on 17 March and captured New York 
City in a series of battles culminating In the capture of 
Fort Washington on 16 November 1776, Governor Sir Guy 
Carleton and Lieutenant General John Burgoyne attempted 
to sieze control of Lake Champlain. However, through 
Brigadier General Benedict Arnold's brilliant delaying 
actions, they were frustrated.
1. Gage to North 12 June 1775; Sir John Fortescue, ed., 
myi o C o m  e s  n o r  d e r o e  o r  Kirs* Georme the Third From 1 7 6 0 
to December 178sj On vols.: 2nd ed. ; London: Frank 
Cass and Co., l?6^), ITT, pp. 21-W5.
2. Lord Howe to Germain 2.5 Sep. 1775; Historical Miami- 
senlots Commission, Report on the waruscrlots of Mrs. 
Stoof ord-Sackvi lie of Dray ton Ho’mea Northa.mpsh i re
(2 vols.; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910) 
IT, P. 9.
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With this background, the British armies settled into 
winter quarters and bep*an preparing for the coming campaign. 
On 13 December 1776 the King suggested to LorcLNorth that 
Burgoyne should move down from Canada to meet Howe moving 
up from New York City at Albany.- This was just a ten­
tative suggestion as the King, to .judge from the small nor- 
tion of his correspondence devoted to military subjects, 
believed, in leaving the actual conduct of the war to Germain. 
Germain on the other hand believed that the officer on the 
spot understood the war better and deferred planning respon- 
sibility to the .generals in North America.
Howe's initial plan submitted for ministerial approval 
was - dated 30 November 1776, when Washington was in full re­
treat. It called for a ten thousand man force to move 
towards Boston from Rhode Island while a two thousand man 
garrison retained Newport. Sir Henry Clinton, who had sxezed 
Newport, 'was to command this force. Five thousand men would 
hold Mew York City while ten thousand moved up the Hudson to 
Albany. A final eight thousand men would occupy New Jersey 
until the fall, when the completion of the other operations 
freed forces for a drive through Pennsylvania and Virginia. 
This would be followed by the conquest of the southern colo- 
nies during the winter. This plan required a reinforcement
3« King to North 13 Dec. 1776; Fortescue, Correspondence of 
George the Third t III, op. 406—7.
£4*. Gerald S. Brown, The American Secr0tary : The Colonial 
PoliC’,r o L o ^ d  Geor0"0 Germau n . 1 7 *7 9—1 078 , (A m  Arbor,
Mich.: University of Mi ehigan Press, 1963), P* ^9•
5. William Howe to Germain 30 Nov. 1776; Manuscripts of 
Stopford —Sackvi11 e , II, pp. A q - 51,
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of fifteen thousand men and profoundly upset Germain.^ 
During the winter Burgoyne had arrived in England 
carrying Carleton*s proposals for the 1777 campaign. On 
10 December he had an interview with Germain in which he 
presented this proposal and his own modifications* The 
essence of this plan was that a reinforced army from Canada 
would drive down the Mohawk and possibly the Connecticut 
rivers. There was no hint of cooperate on with the main
7
army, or of operations on the Hudson.
A letter from Howe dated 20 December arrived on 23
February proposing a radical change in plans based on the
idea that the capture of Philadelphia would be easy. This
new plan called for a two thousand man garrison for Bhode
Island and four thousand to hold New York City. The main
push of ten thousand men would move from New Jersey and
sieze Philadelphia. A further three thousand men would
operate on the lower Hudson. If any further men were sent
q
they could be used for additional operations.
Washington promptly took advantage of the British 
cessation of operations for the winter to score the crucial 
victories at Trenton and Princeton. This forced Howe to 
pull back his outposts from the Delaware River and abandon 
his occupation of most of New Jersey.
As a result of these setbacks, Howe revised his plans
7* Manusor? ots of Stooford-Sackvtlle. II, p. 222,
8. Brown, Amor isen Secretary, p. 94.
9. Manuscripts of Stnrford-Sackvilie * II, pp. 52-3*
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on 20 January. This plan was received and approved by both
the King and Germain on 3 March 1777, and Howe was notified
immediately. This new plan definitely established that
Howe's objective would be Philadelphia, and that any other
operation would depend solely on the number of reinforcements
sent, Germain and the King both approved of this objective,
which did not mention in any way a joint operation on the
Hudson. It did provide, however, for keeping the main army
10between Washington1s force and the Hudson.
On 5 March the King read a memo from Burgoyne presen­
ting a modified plan for the Canadian army. In this plan 
he strongly urged that an operation be conducted down, the 
Mohawk River, and suggested Lieutenant Colonel Barry St.
Leger as the obvious choice for its command. In the main 
operation, he recommended that the commander decide on his
objective (Albany, into Massachusetts, or down the Gonnecti-
11cut River) after the campaign began. This plan was ap-
proved, and Germain prepared instructions for Burgoyne, who
12had been selected to lead the Canadian army. Burgoyne*s
force was composed of over seven thousand regulars, St. Leger*s
of several hundred regulars, a regiment of loyalists, and
several hundred Indians. Carleton remained in Canada with
11thirty-seven hundred regulars.
10. Brown, American Secretary, p. 9^ •
11. Fortescue, Correspondence of George the Third, III, 
pp. 443-4.
12. Germain to King 18 Mar. 179?; Thi d .. ITT, p. 42?.
13* Annual R r‘rri 3 Kov* or a Vi ew of the F 1 sto^y t Pol 1 tics , and
Literature Far the Vear 1777. (London: Printed for J.
Dodsley, 17WT, p. I7*5.
Becent scholarship has decisively proved that a junction
of Howe and Burgoyne at Albany was never considered essential
to the campaign. Burgoyne was expected to he able to reach
Albany on his own, and only after the end of 1777 was a
1 id
British cordon to be established along the Hudson. Even
in his defense before Parliament Burgoyne admitted that he
1 5expected to winter at Albany. Germain wrote Carleton on
26 March informing him of the instructions which had been
issued to Burgoyne giving him freedom of action until Howe
16should join him at Albany. This looseness, which also
included approving Howe's plans for Philadelphia on 26
March, was designed deliberately to allow flexibility to
17meet unexpected circ\?mstances. 1
Burgoyne and Sir Henry Clinton, who was also on leave
in England, met for dinner on 10 March. They discussed their
forthcoming roles, and Clinton became convinced, that while
no physical junction was planned, Whitehall did expect the
campaign to be decisive and that cooperation would be ne~
1 8cessary. ~ Burgoyne departed England on 27 March, and ar­
rived at Quebec on 6 May. Clinton arrived at New York on 
5 July.
111. Brown, American Secretary, p. 101.
15* ohn A -State of the Ex red1 te on from Canada as
laid before the House of Commons, (2nd ed•j London: 1. 
Almon, 1780; Reprint ed.; New York: Arno Press, 1969), 
pp. 15-6. 16. Germain to Carleton 26 Mar.
17??: Mann script 7 of S tc.mf or»d—Sackville. 11, pp • 61 — 3 •
17 * Hr own, Ameyri can Secretary. p. 10 5.
18. William Vi 11 cox , "Too Mary Cooks : Prit 
Before Saratoga, " -Tonr^al of British Stud
sh Planning 
es. II (Novem­
ber , 1962), p. 59 * Willi am b. V i 11 c ox, Portrait of a
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Confusion began to arise when Howe changed his plans 
again. In a letter of 2 April, received on 18 May by.Ger­
main, he announced that he was abandoning New Jersey and 
attacking Pennsylvania by sea vzith eleven thousand men.
Major General Tryon would be left with a corps of three thou­
sand loyalists to operate either on the Hudson or in Connec­
ticut as circumstances dictated. Garrisons of forty-seven 
hundred and twenty-four hundred men would be left in New 
York and Rhode Island respectively. On 5 April he had in­
formed Carleton of this change, so Burgoyne was well aware 
of it, as well as the fact that Howe1s campaign would start 
relatively late.^
The old myth of the "pigeonholed dispatch1 has been 
finally laid to rest. Christian D'Oyley, one'of Germain's 
secretaries, supposedly neglected to send a message to Howe 
telling him to move to Albany in support of Burgoyne. In 
fact the letter was sent, and received on 5 June, informing
Howe of Burgoyne's plans and instructions. No mention was
20
made of any cancellation of the Philadelphia thrust.
Howe's final change of plans was expressed on 16 July.
By then, of course, it was too late for Germain to exercise 
any coordination. In this letter Howe stated explicitly 
that he was sailing against Philadelphia. He believed that 
even if Washington siezed the opportunity to move against 
Burgoyne, there was no need to worry since Burgoyne had
19. Both letters are in Manuscripts of Sto.pfo^d-Gackvllle. 
II, pp. 63-6.
20. Brown, American Secretary, pp. 112-5-
4?
enough men to take care of himself. If this eventuality
occurred, Howe stated that he would reinforce Clinton.
Clinton, who would he left in charge at New York City, could
then operate against Washington's rear. But he expected
that his move would draw Washington south, freeing Burgoyne
21from having any problems other than transport.
At this point the actual Campaign of 1777 got underway. 
Events in. America had not been at a standstill, however, and 
to properly understand the campaign it is necessary to 
review them. But it is significant to note that none of the 
five principal British planners (Germain, Burgoyne, Howe, 
Carleton, and Clinton) properly recognized the value of the 
Highlands* the one really crucial factor in the success of 
operations for the year.
21. Howe to Germain 16 July 1776; Manuscripts of Stooford- 
Sackvilla. IT, pp. 72-3.
CHAPTER V
PRELIMINARY MANEUVERS OP THE 1777 CAMPAIGN
As the new year began in the Highlands, enlistments of
the Continental troops expired. Some men did reenlist on the
spot, but until the new Continental Line could be raised the
situation was considered dangerous. A call was sent out for
one thousand militia to be mobilized to fill the void. Prom
1 January to 31 March an average of 250 were actually on
1
duty, and they provided a weak, but sufficient, force. The
major fear of the generals in the Highlands at this time was
9
not a British attack, but loyalists."
When Washington began his winter offensive operations 
in southern New Jersey he became very conscious of the ad­
vantages of a demonstration against New York City to ease 
the pressure on his position. On 5 January he ordered 
Major General William Heath to gather four thousand militia,
and after leaving a sufficient garrison in the Highlands,
a
to advance on New York City.-' Heath gathered his troops
1. Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the
Middle States During the War for Independence 1775-17811 
(unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 
1936), Appendix B. 2. George Clinton, Public Papers
of George Clinton. (10 vols.; Albany: State of New York, 
1899’Ti ^  passim. 3* Washington to Heath 5 Jan.
1?7?; Willi am Heath, Memoirs of Major-Generni. Wi ] 1 iam
Heath By Hjr^ eelf , ed, by William Abbatt, ”7 Vew York:
William Abbatt, 1901; New York: Arno Press, 1968), 
pp. 97-8.
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at several locations in Westchester County and moved forward 
on 1? January. The three columns reached Kings Bridge, op­
posite the north end of Manhattan, just before„gunrise on 
the eighteenth. Their advance was noticed by an alert
sentry, and they were unable to achieve a surprise of the
4outpost there. Heath then tried to bluff the 350 men in 
the fort into, surrendering, but they knew strong reinforce­
ments were nearby and held out.^ Heath remained in the 
vicinity skirmishing until 29 January when a council of war 
d.ecided that nothing could be achieved, and that a with­
drawal should take place. The Americans, then fell back
A
to form a cordon through Westchester County.~
Washington had advanced to Morristown in the meantime, 
and he remained there for the remainder of the winter. On 
20 February he wrote to Brigadier C-eneral Alexander McDougall, 
in command in the Highlands since 9 February when Heath had 
returned to Massachusetts. Washington was deeply concerned 
with the safety of the forts and recommended that the infan­
trymen at the fo^ts be trained in the use of the cannon
7
until regular artillerymen could be stationed there.'
George Clinton assured Washington that the forts would be
in shape for the opening of the campaign.^
4. Ibid. , PP* 9°-100* 5* Heath to Washington 19 Jan.
1777; Jared Sparks, ed., Correspondence of the Anerjcan 
Revolution. (4 vols.; Poston: Little, Brown,' 1853)1 l"i p. 328.
6. Heath, Memoir0, pp. 101-5.
7. Washington to McDougall 20 Feb. 1777; George Washington,
Writings of George V?ashlugton, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick,
0 9  vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931),
VII, p. 180. (Hereafter referred to as Fitzpatrick.)
8. G. Clinton to Washington 23 Feb. 1777; Clinton, Publ1c
Papers. I, p. 619*
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In March, as the new regiments began to be completed
in their parent states, orders had to be given for them to
concentrate in anticipation of the opening of the campaign.
Washington ordered three of the five New York regiments to
report to the Highlands while the remainder went to Fort
Ticonderoga.^ Eight of the Massachusetts regiments were
ordered to Peekskill, while seven went to Major Genera]
Philip Schuyler at Fort Ticonderoga in anticipation of a
10renewed attack from Canada,. Washington1 s choice of
Peekskill was quite logical. At this point he was unsure
of what the British objective for 1777 was and felt that
Peekskill was a central location from which the troops
11could be easily shifted to meet any eventuality.
Peekskill had also been used as a supply depot, and 
this made it the objective of the first British raid of the 
year. As the port of Courtlandt Manor it was liable to 
attack from the river as long as it was not heavily gar­
risoned. On 23 March Lieutenant Colonel John Bird with 
five hundred men made this raid. They sailed in four 
transports, escorted by the frigate Brune. the galleys 
Crane and Independence which had been captured in 1776, 
and a third galley which had been built during the winter. 
Bird landed at 1 PM with detachments of the Fifth, Twenty- 
third, Forty-fourth and Sixty-fourth regiments and four
9. Washington to McDouga.ll 6 Mar. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII, 
p. 2 57.
10. Washington to Heath 13 Her* 1777; Ibid.. VII, pp. 282-3.
11. Washington to Schuyler 12 Mar. 1777; Ibid.. VII, p. 273.
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field pieces at Lent1s Cove, a mile and a half south of 
town. The Americans, outnumbered, fell back on McDougall*s 
orders to secure the passes above the town. The British 
destroyed the stores and captured one cannon which the Ameri­
cans lacked the horses to evacuate. After an uneventful 
night Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett arrived with sixty 
men from the Third New York. He was able to surprise the 
British advance guard and chase them back into town with a 
bayonet charge. The British took this as an indication of 
significant American reinforcements and reembarked. The
12town was reoccupied by the Americans on the twenty-fifth.
A blue cloak captured by Willett in this action subsequently 
became part of the flag flown at Fort Stanwix during its
1 q
successful defense by the Third New York against St. Leger * ~ -
The Americans became wary of storing materiel near the
river and moved their depots inland to Danbury and Ridgefield
in Connecticut. In late April Howe dispatched Major General
Tryom with a large force of seven regiments and six field
Itguns to destroy these depots. The British force sailed, 
up the Long Island Sound under naval escort to Norwalk, 
where they landed unopposed on 25 April. They marched to
12. J. Aimon, The Remembrancer; or. Impartial Repository of 
Public Svents For the Year 17^7, (London: By the Author, 
1778), pp. 135-6. This account is borne out in McDougall 
to Washington 29 Mar. 1777; Fitzpatrick, V t t , p. 328n.
13* VI111 iam Wi 11 e11, A Narrative of the Military Actions of 
Colonel M arinu.s Willett Taken Chie^lv F^on His Own 
Manuscri nt. fN.ew York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1831 ; New 
York: Arno Press, 1968), p. t2.
It. G. Hutchinson to Germain 30 Apr. 1777; Almon, Remem­
brancer 177?, pp• 11 7-Q.
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Danbury and destroyed the stores there on the twenty-sixth, 
the small American garrison having removed as much as pos­
sible. On the return to the coast by way of Ridgefield, 
the British column was attacked in a running battle remi­
niscent of 19 April 1?75* Brigadier Generals Benedict 
Arnold and David Wooster harassed the British all the way 
to Norwalk, but wehe unable to destroy them because they 
reached the protection of the naval escorts at Cornpo Beach.
A vast quantity of supplies was destroyed, but the raiders
suffered casualties of twenty-six killed-, 116 wounded, and
1 6twenty-nine missing. v American.casualties were similar,
and they felt that the raid had destroyed about half of the
stores. The resulting confusion was particularly felt in
the Highlands where the food reserves were down to three 
16days. One important result of this raid was to convince
the Americans that the western part of Connecticut was
17strategically a part of the Highlands defensive area.
The newly-raised Continentals began arriving at
Peekskill in April. On 3 April Heath started the initial
18Massachusetts detachment en route. Also on 3 April
Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons was ordered to
1°bring the eight Connecticut regiments to Peekskill. '
15. Howe to Germain 22 May 1777; Ibid*, pp. 14-9-50.
16. McDougall to Washington 5 May 1777; Library of Congress, 
George Washington Parers. (Presidential Papers Micro­
films, 1 or". K  heel 41.
17* Doitgl.ass S . Fr eeman, George Washington. Vol. 4 Leader
of the Bevc1u11on, (New York: Seribners, 1951),' p. 5Tl.
18. Heath, Memoi rs, p. 108.
19. Washington to Parsons 3 Apr, 177?; Fitzpatrick, VII,
PP. 35^— 5.
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20The first of the Correcticut trooos began moving or 8 April.
Also ordered to the Highlands was the newly formed Second
Continental Artillery under Colonel John Lamb and Samuel B.
Webb’s "Additional Continental Regiment", both recruited
mainly in Connecticut. The Second, Fourth, and Fifth Mew
York Regiments were ordered to concentrate in the Highlands 
21on 17 April. By the end of April there were eight
Massachusetts, nine Connecticut, two Rhode Island, and
three New York regiments in the Highlands organized in two
22divisions and two independent brigades. ' The major problem
these troops had on their arrival was smallpox innoculation.
Appreciation of the importance of the Highlands was
frequently expressed as spring approached. On 23 March the
chain was finally put in place at Popolopen Creek, and. on
25 March the Continental Congress renewed its interest in
the area. In response to a request from the Mew York Congress
,it was resolved to appoint a Commandant of the Highlands
with the rank of brigadier general. George Clinton was
2B
elected to the job.
Or 1 April George Clinton wrote to Washington from the 
Highlands, stating that while the garrisons of the forts 
were understrength, they were working on the fortifications
20. Parsers to Washington 6 Apr. 1777; Charles S. Hall,
Ijife and Let tar s of Sorrel Holder Parsers ("Binghamton,
N. Y.: Otseningo Publishing Company, 1905), p. °2.
21. Washington to McDougall 1? Apr. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII, 
pp. ^2k~5.
22. Return of the Army for April 1777; Washi. n g t or Parers.
Ser. 4-, reel 4*1.
23* Natl or aI 1r oh 1 ve s , Papers cf the Continental Corgre ss 
1774'—178c, Tr*cnscript Joim^nlf*, r*eo 1 \6~.
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on the landward side to make them more secure. He also
enunciated a distinct fear that the British were anticipating
24operations up the Hudson, Washington was also conscious 
of this possibility, and on 10 April he cautioned McDougall 
to be alert,^ McDougall in turn advised George Clinton 
that the British could dispatch a force of nine hundred men 
from Staten Island up the Hudson at a momenta notice.^ 
George Clinton at this time was very concerned over the 
weakness of the landward defenses of Fort Montgomery, and
relied heavily on a rapid turn-out of militia to protect the
27forts in the event that a British attack should develop.
The Danbury raid produced strategic ripples in the
Highlands, Washington1s intelligence first indicated that
this expedition was to be directed against the Highlands
23and he accordingly warned McDougall. The presence of a body 
of British shipping at Dobbs Ferry effectively immobilised 
the majority of the troops in the Highlands, preventing them 
from attacking Tryon's raiders.^ In response to this 
threat two regiments of Ulster County militia were called 
to Fort M o n t g o m e r y . A n  average total of several hundred
24, George Clinton to Washington 1 Apr. 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers. I, pp. 691-3.
25. Washington to McDougall 10 Apr. 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII,
p. 387. 26. McDougall to George Clinton
21 Apr. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. I, pp. 724-5.
27. George Clinton to New York Congress 2.6 Apr, 1777, Ibid. f
I, p. 736. 28. Washington to McDougall 23
Apr, 1777; Fitzpatrick, VII, p. 455.
29. McDougall to George Clinton 27 Apr. 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers. I, p. 742.
30. George Clinton to Colonel Pawling and Colonel Snyder
2? Apr. 1777; Ibid,. I, pp. ?44-5.
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men spent four months at the fort.^1
Washington remained with the bulk of the Continental 
Army in the strong Middlebrook, New Jersey, position as the 
spring turned into summer. British inactivity obscured any 
intelligible guess about their objective, either Philadel­
phia or Albany. Therefore, he took up a position which 
would allow him the greatest flexibility to meet either 
thrust. He counted heavily on Fort TIconderoga and the forts 
on the Delaware River to guard the extreme flanks of his 
strategic position and delay any British offensive until 
the army could concentrate at the danger point. His force 
at Middlebrook would be well-protected and at the same time 
protect most of New Jersey, The concentration of New York
and Hew England troops In the Highlands served the same
32function for that area.
Washington became deeply concerned with the force in
the Highlands and the forts because they played such a vital
role in his plans. He wrote to McDougall that
The imperfect state of the Fortifications of Fort 
Montgomery, gives me great uneasiness; because I 
think, from a Concurrence of Circumstances, it 
begins to look as if the Enemy intend to turn their 
Viex?s towards the North CHudson3 River, instead of 
the Delaware I therefore desire that Genl. Geo:
Clinton and yourself will fall upon every Measure 
to put the Fortifications in such a State, that they 
may at least resist a sudden Attack, and keep the 
Enemy employed until reinforcements may arrive.33
31. Colonel Hasbrouck*s Statement of 18 June 1778; Ibid.f
II, p. 469.
32. James T. FIexner, George Washington in the American
Revolution. (Boston: Little, 1967), pI 2047"
33. Washington to McDougall 7 May 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII,
p. 26.
A second letter especially warned him to protect his landward
approaches. Parsons was instructed to keep his regiments
concentrated rather than spreading them thin trying to protect 
3too much. y Arnold, generally considered the finest combat
general in the army, was ordered to take command at Peekskill,
but was recalled before he could report, due to his promotion.
36Major General Israel Putnam was sent in his place. This
decision would have disastrous repercussions in October.
To inform himself of the exact status of the Highlands,
Washington dispatched Major General Nathaniel Greene, his
right-hand man, -Brigadier General Henry Knox, Chief of the
Continental Artillery, and Brigadier General Anthony Wayne
on 12 May to inspect the area. They were especially
cautioned to Investigate the possibility of an attack on
37the forts from the landward side."' Their report was a 
hard, realistic look at the situation, and was summarized 
succinctly. "We beg leave to observe that the object is 
too important to be trusted to its present security.” Their 
principle suggestion, to which McDougall and George Clinton 
adhered, required that a body of four to five thousand men 
be stationed permanently in considerably strengthened forti­
fications. This would allow the field army total freedom of 
movement. Minor points included placing a boom and several
*7 ^*
cables in frorj; of the chain to eliminate any possibility
"j-
of it being snapped by a ship attempting to ram it, and
f
stationing the two Continental frigates and two row-galleys 
at the chain to add to the defensive firepower. This last 
point they had taken upon themselves to enact, ordering 
Captain John Grenrell of the Constitution to bring his 
squadron there as soon as possible. Their conclusion was 
that if the river defenses could be made strong enough the 
forts would not be attacked, as "the passes through the
OO
Highlands are so exceedingly difficult."D
Washington 'acted swiftly on this report. On 2k May he
reported to the Congress that he had ordered Major General
•r?-
Putnam to spdre no effort to finish the forts and emplace a
qq
boom, cables being impractical. ' He T*/as to adopt the 
suggested strategy in 1?78 and never deviate from it. But 
this report did cause him to believe that by leaving Putnam 
with four thousand men, including militia, the posts would 
be safe. Four thousard Continentals might very well have 
been inadequate to offset Putnam. .
McDougall filed a follow-up. report on 19 May. In this
report he .seated that if the troops would not defend the 
naturally strong passes, they would not defend works. Never- 
the less he -vTas erecting earthworks to cover the defiles as 
Washington requested. He had ordered work on the extensive
38. Greene ajb al. to Washington 17 May 1777; Washington 
Papers. Ser. Jj-, reel kt m 
351.- gl^Shingtor to Congress 2k May 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII,
gV '* - P 4?- % jU? -h
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river batteries at Port Montgomery to be temporarily suspended 
while redoubts were constructed to protect the landward 
approaches of Ports Clinton and Montgomery* Fort Constitu­
tion was useless in his opinion once Port Montgomery was 
passed, but he had also ordered steps to be taken there to 
protect its rear. He also believed that a landward assault 
was out of the question and was more concerned with obtaining 
the ships to prevent a sudden attack from the river. As far
as the state of the troops went, he reported that the Massa-
40chusetts regiments were sickly and 0almost naked."
Washington responded to this report by stressing that 
he was unfamiliar with the area and would defer to the 
opinions of McDougall and George Clinton. He authorized 
McDougall to man the frigates and galleys from the army 
until seamen could be procured. But above all he empha­
sised that the Continentals should be concentrated and not
4ldispersed to cover Connecticut. Putnam assumed command
Ilo
on 1 June 1777.
The Highlands troops were also used offensively in the 
summer of 1777. A detachment of Parson1s brigade of Connec- 
ticut troops raided Sag Harbor, Long Island on 23 May. ^ 
Washington also hoped to stage a raid on Kings Bridge by
40® McDougall to Washington 19 May 1777; Washington Papers,
S e r 4 reel 41
41. Washington to McDougall 20 May 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII,
P. 95*
42. Israel Putnam, General Orders Issued by Major-General 
Israel Putnam When In Com :and of the Highlands, In the 
Summer and Pall of -£222, ed. by Worthington C. Ford, 
'(Brooklyn, ri.X.: Historical Printing Club, 1893)» P. 6.
43. A full account is found in Parsons to Washington 25 May 
1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII, p. 139n.
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having the troops at Peekskill embark supposedly as a rein­
forcement for the forts and then suddenly drop down the 
44river. While nothing ever happened as a result of this 
plan, Putnam continually worked on the idea of raiding the 
British outposts.
On 12 June 1777 Washington called a Council of War to 
discuss possible plans for the coming campaign. While the 
exact British objective still was not clear, Washington 
requested opinions on the size of the Continental garrison 
which should be left in the Highlands. It was agreed that 
a total of one thousand effective (enlisted men fit for 
duty), together with convalescents and militia would be 
f< sufficient to defend the Posts there under the present 
appearances of affairs. * An additional force of approxi­
mately one regiment should be left at Morristown for com-
46munications purposes. ^ Washington accordingly ordered
Putnam to send all his Continentals in excess of one thou-
46sand to the main army*
At this point Howe advanced into New Jersey, maneuver­
ing there until the end of the month in an effort to lure 
the Americans into an open battle. It was here that 
Washington revealed his maturity as a commanding officer.
His refusal to be tempted away from the strong position at 
Middlebrook, or to be frightened into marching to defend the
44. Washington to Putnam 25 May 1777; Ibid., VIII, pp. 121-2. 
45* "Varick Transcripts of Minutes of Continental Councils 
of War," Washinr.ton Papers f Ser. JFf reel 25.
46. Washington to Putnam 12 June 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII, 
p. 294.
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Delaware River as he had do?ie in 1?76 completely frustrated 
4?Howe. The British withdrew and began embarking on 1 July. 
This was completed or 9 July but Howe did not board ship 
until the seventeenth, when the fleet stood down to the 
Narrows, Finally, on 22 July, the fleet set sail for 
Fh i 1 ad e 1 ph i a .
This lethargy on the part of Howe completely confused
the Americans. An effort to determine troop dispositions and
composition of units of the Continental Army from mid-June
to mid-August becomes an almost impossible task. Units were
shifted on an almost daily basis, and frequently spent weeks
moving back and forth between New Jersey and the Highlands
4a
as estimates of the British objective changed,. The effect 
on the morale of the troops was summarized best by Brigadier 
General John Glover, who said, "Such is the fluctuating sit­
uation of our Army, that we cannot tell this day, where we
60shall be the next."^ American estimates of the situation 
47* Flexrer, George Warh 1.nmton. p. 206,
48 • John And r^ j~” Major An d reG "s J ournal : on s of the
B r i  tl A r»rry or» J,j f flavi r> "J <? g ■*» ’,*/i 1 ^ a m  H O W O
and Si ^  Tto7"!ir qi i ^ t^n June, 1 707 to *1 ovemven  ^B 7 R ed« 
by C. DeW. Wi 11cox~7" ( Tarrytown, li. Y »: William Abbatt,
1930), pp. 33-4.
49# For further reference: Fitzpatrick, VTTX and TX is the
easiest to handle as it incorporates much material from 
the Washington Papers in book format* Putnam, General
Orders. gives ■oertiuent data on the Highlands organiza­
tion. Any collection of the papers of brigade or 
regimental commanders gives the view of the individual 
uni t.
50. Glover to Azor Orne 22 June 1777; "Transcripts of the 
letters and Orderly Books of John Glover 1776-1781," 
(typescripts in New York City Public Library of the 
originals at the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.)
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varied immensely. At one moment they were convinced that 
Howe had sailed for Philadelphia, at the next that he was 
only executing a deep feint prior to ascending the Hudson to 
link up with Burgoyne.
Throughout this period Washington repeatedly stressed 
in his letters to Putnam the importance of holding the 
Highlands, Over and over again he emphasized that Putnam 
must keep his forces concentrated in the Highlands, and 
forsake trying to protect Westchester Country and the Connec- 
ticut shoreline. Although Putnam never gave up the possi­
bility of raiding British outposts, and never concentrated 
as ordered, he did keep his men alert. Five musters a day
were standard procedure, and the troops were forbidden to
r'2get beyond recall distance from their encampments. "
To further complicate matters, Burgoyne1s expedition 
started scoring impressive successes, requiring additional 
regiments to be sent to Schuyler's army, On 13 June the 
advance elements had left Canada. Fort Ticonderoga, the 
supposed 8Oilbralter of America* proved to be a paper tiger 
and was hastily evacuated on 5 July, The retreating Ameri­
cans were further demoralized by defeats of their rear guard 
elements on 7 July at Hubbardton and Fort Anne on 8 July.
Putnam was ordered to dispatch Brigadier General John Nixon's 
Massachusetts brigade on 5 July and John Glover1s Massachusetts 
brigade on 28 July. ^
51. For examole: Washington to Putnam 2 5 June, 30 June,
13 July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VTII, pp. 300, 321, 393-^•
52. Putnam, General Orders, p. 18,
53. Glover to Orne 8 July 1777; "Glover Transcripts. *’ Glover
to Timothy Pickering 28 July 1777; Ihid.
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The Highlands were further reduced during July by 
transfers of troops to Washington's army. In Washington's 
defense it must be admitted that he fully expected Putnam to 
make up these losses by calling out the militia, for Washing­
ton realized that HIf vie can keep genl Howe below the High-
ZIl
lands, I think their Schemes will be entirely baffled.1 >
On 24 July Stirling's division and Major General John Sul­
livan's division were withdrawn from supporting positions in 
New Jersey along with all artillery in excess of the standard 
two guns per brigade, and Lamb's Second Continental Artillery 
Regiment, a weak one, which was part of the garrison of the 
f o r t s , O n  yi July a further two brigades, those of McDou­
gall and Jedediah Huntington, were ordered south to join the 
field army. These had been Putnam's s t r o n g e s t . T h e  last 
day of July was the day when Washington finally committed 
himself to the belief that Howe's objective was Philadelphia, 
On that day the field army was ordered to cross the Delaware 
and head for that city "with all possible dispatch.11" ‘
The situation in the Highlands at the end of Ju1 y was
somewhat ambiguous. The ships had taken up anchorage at
68Popolopen Creek in the latter half of June. The frigates
54. Washington to Schuyler 2 July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VTII,
pp. 781~S. 65. Washington to Putnam 24 July
1777; Tbld., VTII, r. 460.
56. Washington to Putnam 31 July 1777; Ibid., VIII, p. 503. 
Jedediah to Jabez Huntington 28 July 1777 ; ’Huntington 
Papers: Correspondence of the Brothers Joshua and 
Jedediah Huntington During the Period of the American 
Revolution 1771-1787," Connecticut Historical Society 
Collections, XX (1923), pp. 755-6.
57* W a eh 1 n ,g t. o r Parers. Sen. 3C-, reel 26.
58. G-. Clinton to Putnam 15 June 1777; Clinton, Public
Parers. II, p. 34.
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W0r*0 tjndormanno d and poor 1.y armed, with only the Cor 
having c a m  or , nine pouv-d er s taker from Fort Cor s hi tu t ^ cr.
6Q
The two gal lies, the Shank and the Compd or T wepe also there.
The cables from the frigates had been stretched in front of 
60the chair."
Washington,■although he had drawn off a large number 
of Putnam's Continentals, felt that the posts were not en­
dangered as long as Putnam kept enough militia, on duty to
61
prevent the forts from becoming a tempting target.
However, on the thirty-first of July the militia went home, 
dangerously weakening the Highlands. This left only Lamb's 
artillery regiment, Colonel Lewis Dubois' Fifth New York, 
and a few small detachments as garrisons of the forts.^
Putnam retained only cue brigade of Continentals as a field 
force. This was Parsons' brigade, composed of Colonel 
Henry Sherburne1 s and Colonel Samuel B. Webb's 1 Additional 
Continental Regiments, " Colonel. Charles Webb's Second Connec­
ts cut, Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs' Sixth Connecticut, and
6 3Colonel Samuel Wyllys' Third Connecticut regiments."J Parsons 
attempted to warn. Washington that troop strength in the 
Highlands had fallen to a dangerous level, as did George 
Clinton, who also stated that he had been elected Governor
59. G. Clinton to Putnam 4 July 1777; Ibid.T II, p. 75;
Putnam General Orders r* 5k,
60. G, Clinton, to Washington 11 July 1777; Clinton, Public 
Parens, IT, p. 107. 61. Washington, to G. Clinton 
25" July 1777; Fitzpatrick, VIII, p. 473.
62. G, Clinton to Putnam 26 July 1777; Clinton, Pub!ic 
Papers? II, pp. 139-40.
63. Hall, Parsonsy p. 106.
f/}.
of Now York and had to spent part of hi s t1 ire at the ear!tol 
fh
at Kingston, " Putnam, however, remained optimistic, al­
though he did. request reirforcprents if Washington could 
spare them. This was necessary, he felt, because he had to 
maintain a five hundred man force under Parsons at White 
Plains.^
By the end of July the war seemed to have left the 
New'York City-Highlands area. Howe had departed for Phila­
delphia leaving small defensive garrisons at New York City 
and Rhode Island. Washington had followed him with the 
bulk of the Continental troops. Burgoyne was advancing 
relentlessly towards Albany with Schuyler opposing him 
with the other Continental field array. Putnam was left 
in command of the Highlands facing Sir Henry Clinton at New 
York City.
6A. Parsons to Washington 30 July 1777; ibid., pp. 106-7;
G. Clinton to Washington 26 July 1777; Clinton,
Public Papers, _ II, pp. lkO-1.
65. Putnam to Washington 31 July 1777; Sparks, Comes pon­
ders e . I , op. Al?-8.
CHAPTER VI 
SIR HENRY CLINTON ATTACKS THE HIGHLANDS
Sir Henry Clinton arrived at New York City on 5 July 
as Howe was preparing to sail for Philadelphia. Sir Henry 
was properly horrified. In a series of meetings on the 
sixth, eighth and thirteenth, he argued that a move to 
Pennsylvania, especially by sea, was a waste of the campaign. 
He vigorously insisted that the army must advance against 
the Highlands to retain the initiative. By going to Penn­
sylvania Howe would allow Washington three alternatives.
Sir Henry saw the most distinct possibility as an American 
move to "1murder us1R in Hew York City. Another large 
possibility was that Washington could go north and make 
things very hot for Burgoyne. A final option that Washington 
had was to march south to block Howe. While Clinton by no 
means foresaw a calamity, he did fear a setback which would 
prevent the campaign from being as decisive as Whitehall 
wished.1
This controversy also split the other members of Howe*s 
staff. Major Generals Charles Gray and Sir William Erskin© 
supported Clinton, while Major General the Earl Cornwallis,
1. William B. Willcox, "Too Many Cooks: British Planning
Before Saratoga,H Journal of British Studies. II, (Novem­
ber, 19^2), pp. 69-70. This is based on an interpreta­
tion of Clinton1s notes at the Clements Library.
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whom Clinton was later to call the evil genius behind Howe's
2
decision, favored the Pennsylvania campaign. When the
fleet finally departed Sir Henry was left in command of New
York City and its dependencies, that is, a one-hundred mile
perimeter of outposts. He was given a force of 7,6^1 rank
and file, which Howe felt was sufficient.*^ Of these troops,
almost one half were loyalists. The ten battalions of
loyalists were considered by the British to be of value
primarily as forragers and garrison troops. There was also
a brigade of German mercenaries under Brigadier General
Schmidt, composed of seven regiments. The key striking force
of the New York garrison troops was composed of detachments
of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, three companies of the
Fourth Battalion of the Royal Artillery Regiment, and seven
h,
infantry regiments of British regulars* Major General 
Robert Pigot was left in Rhode Island with three British 
regiments, four German regiments, and a detachment of Royal 
Artillery, approximately three thousand men.^
2.
5.
William B. Willcox, Portrait of a. General: Sir Henry
Clinton in the War of Independence, (New York: Alfred
Knopf, vfbk), p. 163. 3* Howe to Germain 7 July
1777; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the 
Manuscripts of Mrs, Stopford-Sackviile of Drayton House, 
NorthampshireT (]T~vols. V London: His Majesty 1 s Station­
ery Office, 1910), II, pp. ?i-2.
These regiments were the 7th, 26th, 35th, 33,th, **5th,
55 th, and 63rd Foot. John Andrd, Maj or Andr& 1s Journal: 
Operations of the British Army Under Lisu'conant Generals 
Sir Vi ill lam Howe ana Sir Henry Clinton June. 1777 to 
November. 1776. ed. by C. Dew. Willcox, v Tarrytown, N.Y. 
W i 11 i anf Abba11, 1930), p. 2?.
C. T. Atkinson, 15British Forces in North America, 177**- 
1731: Their Distribution and Strength,” Journal of the
Society for Army Historical Research. XVI (January,
193577 p7 ir.
67
While Sir Henry was not seriously worried about the 
possible capture of New York City, he was very conscious 
of the vulnerability of his outposts, especially Staten 
Island and Long Island. This prompted him to constantly 
reshuffle his forces to meet real and imagined threats 
against various sectors of his perimeter. He was particu­
larly afraid that Washington would choose not to follow 
Howe and concentrate against New York City. He was greatly 
relieved to discover on 30 July that Washington was leaving 
New Jersey for Pennsylvania.
Washington had made his decision to march to defend 
Philadelphia on the appearance of the British fleet off the 
mouth of the Delaware River. When the Howe brothers de­
cided that it was an inopportune site and sailed for 
Chesapeake Bay on 1 August, Washington began to have second 
thoughts. He assumed that the maneuver had been merely a 
deep feint to draw him from the Highlands, and that the 
fleet was returning to New York. He therefore halted his 
army and disx^atched the rear elements, Stirling's and Sul­
livan's divisions, to Putnam's aid, along with McDougall*s
and Huntington's brigades which were en route to join the 
7field army.1 He warned Putnam to be vigilant as
6. Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. by
William B. Willcox, INew Haven: Yale University Press,
195**) * pp. 66-70* 7. A series of orders from
Washington on 1 Aug. 1777; George Washington, Writings 
of George Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick^ (39 
vols^; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931)>
IX, pp. 3-7. (Hereafter cited as Fitzpatrick)•
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The importance of preventing Mr. Howe’s getting 
possession of the Highlands by a coup de, main, 
is infinite to America, and in the present 
Situation of things, every effort that can be 
thought of must be used.8
This uncertain situation persisted for most of August.
By the twenty-first Washington had begun to consider the 
possibility that the British were going to attack Charleston,
Q
South Carolina.7 All uncertainty evaporated the next day when
the British were seen in the Chesapeake. The army was
informed at 10 PM on 21 August that it would march at AM
10for Philadelphia* The troops sent to support the Highlands
11were recalled on 22 August with one exception. This was 
McDougall’s brigade which was detached to cover New Jersey 
on 10 September, and ordered to Pennsylvania on the nine­
teenth to replace Washington's losses in the Battle of
12Brandywine (11 September).
August was a troubled month for Putnam. As one soldier
wrote on 9 August
We are not without Expectations of an attack....
It is a matter of doubt with me whether they 
will attack us among the hills here CPeekskillj 
unless they carry that Portress LFort Montgomeryj . «
•••• The fort is strong if that is any consequence. ^
8* Washington to Putnam 1 Aug. 1777; Ibid., IX, p. 1.
9* Washington to Congress 21 Aug. 1777; Ibid.» IX, pp. 107-8.
10. "Varick Manuscripts of General Orders,“ Library of 
Congress, George Washington Papers. (Presidential Papers 
Microfilms, 1961), S er• 3G~, reel 26.
11. Washington to Sullivan 22 Aug. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX,
pp. 115-6. 12. Washington to Putnam 10
Sep. 1777, to McDougall 19 Sep. 1777; Ibid.. IX,
pp. 218-9, 239* 13* David to Brown 9 Aug. 1777;
Ebenezer David, A Rhode Island Chaplin in the -Revolution: 
Letters of Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown 1775-1778. ed. 
by Jearme11e~~black and William KoeIker (Pr ov idenee:'
Rhode Island Society of the Cincinnati, 19^9), PP. 38-9.
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Twenty-five hundred militia were called out to meet the
anticipated emergency, and twelve hundred reported speedily,
hut dissipated just as fast when the British failed to
materialize. Even in the face of this danger Putnam
ordered Parsons to send five hundred men to Connecticut to
attempt a raid on Long Island. Colonel Samuel B. Webb's
attack on 22 Agust failed because the loyalist detachment
1 *5was forewarned. Parsons* brigade remained at White Plains
16until the middle of September. In September another call
for twenty-five hundred militia to man the forts was sent
out. The response to this alarm was even more transitory
than August*s. Only three to five hundred men turned out,
17and dissipated after less than a vreek. f This error in 
dispersing the Continental troops and calling out the militia 
on false alarms was to have fatal consequences in October.
Burgoyne*s advance from Canada began to run into 
difficulty in late summer. St. Leger1s advance down the 
Mohawk Valley met determined resistance from the Third New 
York at Port Stanwix. The bloody Battle of Orinskany weakened 
St. Leger considerably, and rumors of an. American relief 
expedition forced him to retreat to Canada on 23 August.
While Burgoyne wrote Sir Henry Clinton on 6 August con­
fidently predicting that he would reach Albany on the
1*K Hugh Jameson, "The Organization of the Militia of the
Middle States During the War fbr Independence 1775-1781,” 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 
1936), Appendix B. 15. Charles S. Hall, Life
and Letters of Samuel Holden Parsons (Binghamton, N .Y .: 
Otseningo Publishing Co., 1905), PP* 108-9.
16. Ibid., p. 113* 17. Jameson, “Militia of the
Middle States,? Appendix B.
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18twenty-third, his force suffered some reverses. A major 
forraging expedition was decimated at Bennington on 16 
August, and he was forced to regroup his army.- He started 
his final push on Albany on 11 September, but paused at 
Major General Philip Schuyler's estate three days later to 
harvest grain. The first hint of disaster came when his 
advance was stopped cold at the First Battle of Freeman's 
Farm on the nineteenth*
During the spring and summer the British had used the 
valley of the Hudson as a route through which to send 
messengers between New York City and Burgoyne• These men
IQ
were frequently caught and hung as spies. 7 Colonel Samuel
B. Webb's “Additional Continental Regiment" was particularly
effective at intercepting messengers, having been outfitted
on 28 June with captured British uniforms. Because so many
loyalists mistook them for British troops they were known
20as the “Decoy" Regiment. On 21 July Howe had directed his 
chief of intelligence to hire an American prisoner of war 
to carry (unknowingly) a false dispatch to Burgoyne in the 
hopes that Washington would capture it and conclude that 
the British were going to attack Boston. As expected, the
18. Burgoyne to Clinton 6 Aug. 1777; Clinton, American
Rebellion, p. 70. 19* John Bakeless, Turncoats,
Traitors and Heroes, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1959/,
p.’ I W ,  20. Samuel Blachley Webb,
Correspondence and Journals of Samuel Blachley Webb, 
ed. by Worthington C. Ford~ C3vols.; New York:
Wickersham Press, 1893-^), II, p. 5*
21. Willcox, "Too Many Cooks," p. 75*
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messenger, a "Mr. Williams," gave himself up. The ruse was 
seen through immediately, and Williams revealed the descrip­
tions of several other couriers, including one "Taylor" who
22was to carry a vital message later.
A more successful spy venture was made during August
when an agent spent a week examining the Highlands and
21reported to Clinton. J The information this agent brought
back, together with Colonel Beverly Robinson's knowledge of
the area, provided Clinton with valuable information which
ojx
he would subsequently use against the Highlands.
Sir Henry had not conducted a static defense even with 
his manpower shortage. Prom 12 to 16 September he conducted 
a forraging expedition into New Jersey. A secondary objec­
tive4 of this raid was to try and destroy McDougall8s 
brigade. In this he was unsuccessful, but following the 
British withdrawal McDougall marched south to join Washington. 
Clinton now began to realize how dangerously weak and out of 
position Putnam * s force was.^^ On 11 September he wrote to 
Burgoyne that if Burgoyne wished it, Clinton would stage
a diversion against the Highlands with two thousand men as
26soon as expected reinforcements arrived from Europe.
22. Glover to James Warren 25 July 177?; "Transcripts of the 
letters and Orderly Books of John Glover 1776-1781," 
(Typescripts in New York City Public Library of originals 
at the Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.).
23« Bakeless, Turncoats. p. 163.
24. Clinton, American Rebellion, p. ?6.
25. Willcox. Portrait of a General, p. 177*
26. Clinton5 to Burgoyne 11 Sep. 1777; Clinton, American 
Rebellion, p. 70.
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Clinton by no means considered joining Burgoyne, The best 
he anticiapted doing was dismantling the forts. As far as 
he knew Burgoyne was still planning on wintering at Albany 
and Howe still planned to return to New York, Having dis­
mantled the forts, Clinton expected to persuade Howe to
27link up with Burgoyne in the 1778 campaign, 1 This message 
reached Burgoyne on 21 September, after First Freeman's 
Farm.28
Parsons began warning Putnam that a British move was 
imminent. On 20 September he reported that he had obtained 
intelligence that British reinforcements were expected 
daily, and that Sir Henry was planning to attack the High­
lands ,^  Parsons repeated the warning on 26 September, and 
in a postscript of the twenty-seventh reported that two 
days earlier three thousand reinforcements had arrived at
OQ
New York, On 23 September Washington wrote Putnam repor­
ting that McDougall had only 911 men and that it was
imperative that the rest of the twenty-five hundred Contin­
entals he had requested be sent to him, under Brigadier 
General Varnum. This order was repeated on 28 September.-^1 
Putnam sent these men, stripping his force of Con­
tinentals to a new low. On 27 September he ordered Parsons'
27. Willcox, Portrait of a General, p. 177,
28. John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada as 
laid Before the House of Commons, (2nd, ed.; London: J. 
Almon, 1780; l^ ew York: Arno Press, 1969), p, lxxxviii.
29. Parsons to Putnam 20 Sep. 1777; Hall, Parsons, pp. 113-^.
30. Parsons to Putnam 26/27 Sep. 1777; Ibid.. p. 115*
31. Washington to Putnam 23 Sep. 1777, 28 Sep. 1777; Fitz­
patrick, IX, pp. 253, 280,
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brigade to return to Peekskill.-^ The militia which 
Washington was counting on failed to materialized, however, 
and by the end of the month only three hundred had reported 
out of the six regiments summoned.^3
A large convoy from England had reached New York on 
24 September. It contained seventeen hundred British and 
German reinforcements. Then on 29 September a messenger 
from Burgoyne reached Clinton bearing a message dated 
eight days earlier. In this note Burgoyne replied to 
Clinton1s letter of 11 September by announcing that he was 
preparing to sever his communications with Canada and attempt 
to reach New York City. In this context he stated that even 
a threat against the forts would be of great help.
Sir Henry began his preparations for an assault on 
the Highlands. While Sir Henry was making these preparations, 
Burgoyne * s situation became even more precarious. On 3 
October his army went on half rations. That same day Sir 
Henry had Commodore William Hotham, the senior British 
naval officer at New York, order transports to Spuyten Duyvil 
to embark troops. The flatboats which Hotham ordered in 
three divisions under the overall command of Captain Pownall 
embarked eleven hundred men that afternoon and sailed up 
to Tarrytown. The next morning these men landed at Tarry- 
town where they were joined by a second body of troops
32. Hall, Parsons. p. 115. 33* Circular letter to Com­
manders of Militia Regiments 29 Sep. 1777; George 
Clinton, Public Pacers of George Clinton. (10 vols.; 
Albany: State of New York, 1899), II, p. 3^9.
34. Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 72*
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which marched overland from Kings Bridge. Captain Sir 
Janes Wallace was placed in command of the escorts. These 
consisted of several men-of-war and a flotilla of armed 
galleys. Wallace was a logical choice, based on the ex­
perience he had gained on the river in 1776. A third 
group of troops embarked at New York City and joined the 
others at Tarrytown on the fourth. Hotham joined this 
division aboard his flagship, the frigate Preston.
Clinton later explained that adverse tides prevented his 
force of three thousand men from moving earlier.
During the evening of the fourth all the troops 
reembarked and headed for Kings Ferry. Wallace's squadron 
preceded the transports and, after covering the noon lan­
ding at Verplanck's Point, took up a position in Peekskill 
Bay. ' The vastly outnumbered Americans did not oppose the 
landing and abandoned a cannon when they withdrew. Sir Henry 
fully expected Wallace to effectually prevent Putnam from 
transferring any men to the f o r t s . B u t  to insure con­
fusion among the Americans he had Colonel James Be Lancey 
raid White Plains with sixty of his loyalist Westchester 
Light Horse on the fifth.^ That night a messenger, Captain 
Archibald Campbell, arrived bearing news that Burgoyne was
35. Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; J . Aimon, The Remem­
brancer: or. Impartial Repository of Public Events For 
the Year 1777. (London: By the Author, 1778), pp. 431-2.
36. Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 72.
37. Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer
,1.777f PP. 431-2. 38. Clinton, American Rebel­
lion . p. 73. 39. Rivington8 s (New York
City) Royal American Gazette, 11 Oct. 1777.
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down to five thousand effectives, was cut off, and could only 
hold out until the twentieth. Burgoyne stated that he still 
felt able to reach Albany, but wanted to know how soon sup­
plies could reach him there. An answer in triplicate was 
requested* This profoundly shocked Sir Henry, since the 
last he had heard from Burgoyne was that all was going 
well. He also did not understand how, on the basis of the 
information in his 11 September letter, Burgoyne could
Ilf)
expect to be rescued.
American strength in the Highlands was ridiculously 
absent at this critical juncture. Washington was firmly 
of the opinion that if the British advanced from New York 
City, they would move to Philadelphia through New Jersey.
41
By 1 October he was also convinced that Burgoyne was doomed.
He did solicit militia from Connecticut to strengthen
42Putnam's dangerously small force. The forts themselves 
were poorly manned and quite low on food. Captain Gershorn 
Mott of Lamb's Artillery Regiment commanded at Fort Consti­
tution with a single company in garrison. Colonel Lamb 
commanded at Fort Montgomery with Brigadier General James 
Clinton in overall command of Popolopen Creek's fortifications. 
Dubois* regiment was split between the two forts there, a 
company of Lamb's artillerymen was at each, and there were 
several hundred militia available to man the forts. On
40. Clinton, American Rebellion, pp. 73-4.
4 1 . Washington to Putnam 1 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX, 
pp. 289-90.
42. Washington to Trumbull 1 Oct. 1777; Ibid.f IX, p.
296.
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the east bank Putnam had finally concentrated his forces at 
Peekskill. Parsons' brigade of twelve hundred Continentals
Lrt
was supported by three hundred militia. J
At daybreak on 6 October, a Monday, the British took 
advantage of a heavy fog to reembark the majority of their 
troops and cross to Stony Point. Two loyalist regiments, 
Bayard's and Panning's, remained at Verplanck1s Point as 
did the transports after the assault forces had been ferried 
across. The British column was divided into three groups. 
Lieutenant Colonel Mungo Campbell led the advance guard 
with Colonel Beverly Robinson as his second-in-command.
This force was composed of Campbell's Fifty-second and the 
Fifty-seventh regiments of redcoats, and three loyalist 
units: Robinson's Highlands-raised Loyal Americans, Lieu­
tenant Colonel Andreas Emmerich's Chasseurs, and Major 
Alexander Grant's New York Volunteers. This wing was to 
swing through the hills and strike Fort Montgomery from the
rear. The longer route they had to travel required that they
h-h.
march immediately to secure Dunderberg pass.
Sir Henry personally accompanied Major General John 
Vaughan and the main body. This section was composed of the 
expedition's flank companies, the Twenty-sixth and Sixty- 
third regiments, one company from the Scottish Seventy-first 
Regiment, a troop of dismounted Seventeenth Light Dragoons, 
and Captain von Waldenfels1 Anspach-Beyreuth Chasseur 
company. They were transported in the second wave, and
^ 3* Hall, Parsons. p. 117.
Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 75* See Map 2.
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Map 2
The Battle of 6 October 1777
* Based on John Hill, Sketch of Forts Clinton and Mont­
gomery Stormed the 6th October 1777#««•, Map 16^,
Clinton Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan,
i ^sBri ti sh ^Anisricsiii Elevations
m c  Riverbank 'V£Swamps and Tidal Flats ^Ponds
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followed the advance guard through the passes. Their ob­
jective was to attack Fort Clinton and thus cover the de­
tour of Pampbell. From their supporting position they 
could cover a retreat if Campbell's force failed to 
capture Fort Montgomery.^
The rear guard under Major General William Tryon fol­
lowed in the third wave* They were charged with the re­
sponsibility of keeping communications open to Kings Ferry. 
To secure this end the Seventh Regiment remained at Dunder- 
berg Pass while Tryon brought the Hesse-Cassel Musketeer
Regiment von Trumbach under Colonel E. von Bishoffhausen
46up later in the day to support the main body.
Campbell's force waited for Vaughan's at the pass on 
the west side of the Bunderberg, and the two continued to 
march together until they reached Bear Mountain. At tills 
point Campbell veered west to cross Popolopen Creek and get 
into position to attack Port Montgomery. The main body 
passed east of Bear Mountain and advanced from the south 
against Fort Clinton between the river and a large pond, 
subsequently named Hessian Lake. Hie longer march kept
47Campbell from getting into position until late in the day. 1 
While the British were moving smoothly ahead, the 
Americans were in a state of total confusion. Governor 
George Clinton had arrived at the forts to assume command
45. Ibid., p. 75• 46. Ibid.. p. 75.
4?. Ibid., p. ?6. Also John Hill *s map of the attack in
British Headquarters Maps, Clements Library, Ann Arbor, 
Mich. (Photostats of originals at the New York His­
torical Society, New York, N.Y.)
on the evening of 5 October and immediately dispatched
Major Samuel Logan with a small scouting party to Kings
Perry, Logan returned with a report that the British were
48advancing early in the morning on the sixth. Putnam 
remained completely unaware of the British transfer. His 
scouts reported that a large force was burning the store­
houses at Kings Ferry, and that the British shipping 
seemed to be preparing to attack Fort Independence and 
Peekskill. While he wanted to attack the British, he felt 
it would be unwise with the small force available to him.
So he left his force in the passes and together with Parsons 
rode down to reconnoitre Verplanck1s Point. By the time 
they returned the attack on the forts was already in progres
iic
and it was impossible for him to influence the outcome. 7
Governor Clinton began taking vigorous steps to defend 
the forts. He dispatched a messenger to Putnam for rein­
forcements, but the infamous scoundrel” did not report to
*>QPutnam until late in the afternoon when it was too late."
A small force under Lieutenant Paton Jackson was sent to 
observe the British advance, but it ran into the lead ele­
ments several miles from the forts and retreated. Upon 
hearing this firing a second, larger, force was sent out 
under Lieutenant Colonel Jacobus Bruyn. This column was
48. George Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton, 
Public Paoers. pp. 389-95*
49. Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Jared Sparks, ed., 
Correspondence of the American Revolution (4 vols.; 
Boston; Little, Brown, 1853), I, PP* 43*8-40•
50. Webb, Journals. I, p. 230.
composed of fifty Continentals, fifty militia, and a
three-pound field gun. This force took position behind a
stone wall one-half mile south of Port Clinton. A second
party of similar size was dispatched to cover the approach
to Port Montgomery under the command of Captain Ephraim
Fenno, also with a field piece. This force delayed Campbell
until he could deploy flanking parties which drove in the
defenders, and yet another force which had come to their
support. The gun was captured as was Fenno.
This firing served as the signal ror Vaughan to start
his attack. He cleared Bruyn's troops from their advanced
position and then halted on Clinton*s orders to wait for
<2
Campbell to begin his final attack. In this way pressure 
on the defenders could be maximized by coordinated assaults. 
The frigates Mercury and Tartar and the British galleys then 
advanced upriver and began firing on the forts In support of 
the Infantry attack. The galley Dependence alone fired 
ninety-five rounds at the American forts and shipping from 
,about 5 FM when the attack began until 5:45 when the troops 
became too closely engaged for artillery support. ”
The British assault was more properly a series of 
rushes separated by close range exchanges of musketry.
51• George Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton, 
Public Papers. II, pp. 389-95.
52. C1 inton.~ Arner 1 can Rebe 111 onf p. 76.
53. Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Aimon, Remembrancer 
1777. pp. 4-31-2. 54. Log of the Dependence in
Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed., ‘‘Events on Hudson1 s River 
In 1777, As Recorded by British Officers in Contempor­
ary Reports,H Dutchess County Historical Society Year­
book. XX (1935), P. 96.
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Vaughan9s column attacked the southern face of Fort Clinton, 
especially the three gun redoubt forty yards from the main 
lines. Campbell*s men worked on the western point of Fort 
Montgomery. Three times these rushes were hurled back by 
the badly outnumbered defenders."  About 5 FM Campbell 
approached Fort Montgomery under a flag of truce and 
demanded its surrender. Lieutenant Colonel William S. 
Livingston of S. 33. Webb's regiment summarily rejected it.
The final assaults were made about 5:30 FM, at dusk. 
Vaughan's force, on Clinton's orders, advanced with bayonets 
only and in a hard struggle penetrated Fort Clinton. The 
Trumbach Regiment remained at the stone wall to cover a 
retreat if the assault failed. The attack on Fort Mont­
gomery suffered heavier casualties. Campbell was killed,
and Colonel Beverly Robinson directed the final minutes of 
67
the attack.-"1 Major Grant was also killed, and Captain
George Turnbull assumed command of the New York Volunteers.
Turnbull was the first attacker to enter the works and sur-
68vive, nine men having died in the attempt. Once the forts 
were penetrated, the American resistance crumbled and the 
outnumbered survivors took advantage of the darkness to 
fight their way from the works. With this the firing ended.
55. Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence. 
I, pp. 438-40.
56. G. Clinton to Washington 10 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public 
Papers, II, pp. 389-95.
57. Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 76.
58. Rivinrrton * s Royal GazetteTNew York City), 11 Oct. 1777-
The American squadron failed to make good its escape and 
was burned about 10 PM to prevent its capture. ^
Any estimate of casualties becomes mired in conflic­
ting claims and must be taken with a grain of salt. British 
official admission of forty killed, l4l wounded, and five 
missing is probably a bit less than exact. Losses among 
the defenders amounted to under one hundred killed, but 
263 prisoners including twenty-six officers, mostly militia, 
were taken. American estimates varied widely due to the 
fact that the confusion of the escape prevented the units 
from rallying promptly. Survivors dribbled in for days.
The Birtish captured sixty-seven guns in these two forts, 
and Fort Constitution which subsequently fell. They also
captained over six tons of gunpowder and massive quantities
62of other stores.
All accounts by witnesses on both sides praised the 
•gallantry of the combatants. The badly overmatched Americans 
acquitted themselves well, and the British troops achieved 
remarkable success in an attack made without the benefit of 
close artillery support. The Americans recognized that 1 The 
Fort was finally taken, merely for want of men to man the 
lines, and not for want of spirit in the men." J
59* Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 76.
60. Clinton to Howe-* 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 1777. 
p. 426.
61. Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 79*
62. Clinton to Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 1777. 
pp. 425-6.
63. Parsons to Trumbull 7 Oct. 1777; Hall, Parsons. p. 118.
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On 7 October Sir Henry sent a flag of truce to Fort
Constitution demanding its surrender. However, "contrary
to the practice of civilized nations,1' Captain, Mott fired 
64on it* This development resulted in Mott's decision to 
evacuate the fort after destroying what he could. George 
Clinton managed to cross the river and confer with Putnam 
and Parsons. It was decided to abandon Peekski11 and move 
what stores they could to the relatively safe Fishkill.^
Parsons left Immediately to gather militia from Connecticut,
66returning on the ninth. Putnam retired to Fishkill with
the bulk of the Continentals while George Clinton returned
to the west bank to rally the remnants of the defenders,
and militia at New Windsor. He was joined there on the eighth
67
by S. B. Webb's regiment to provide the stiffening needed. ' 
Far to the north on 7 October, events had occurred which 
made further action in the Highlands futile, Burgoyne had
been severely defeated in the Second Battle of Freeman's
Farm and his surrender was made almost inevitable.
Minor activity occurred on the eighth and ninth. The 
British snapped the chain on 8 October and occupied the 
abandoned Fort Constitution. Upon completing the destruction 
there, Wallace sailed up to probe the chevaux at Polopel 
Island and returned with news that there were no obstacles
64. Clinton, American Rebellionf p. 77.
65. Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence. 
I, PP. 438-40.
66. Hall, Parsons. p. 117.
67. Webb, Journals« I, p. 230.
8)4-
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to hinder advance once that was passed. On 9 October,
Tryon landed with a force at Peekskill and destroyed the
6qevacuated buildings at Continental Village. 7 ~
The Americans spent this time rallying their forces.
Putnam reported to Washington on 8 October that he was
convinced that Albany was the British objective and that
while all possible attempts to annoy their passage would
70be made, he doubted that much could bo done.' These
sentiments were echoed by Parsons who said the troops would
fight, but the outcome of any further actions would be in
71the hands of “the great Arbiter." 1 A note had been sent
to Gates by George Clinton on 7 October advising him of
the fall of the forts.
Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson, Aide-de-Camp to
Gates, replied on 9 October that Burgoyne was in retreat
and that Gates would send all the militia he could spare
72to the Highlands.' This news buoyed American morale.
Sir Henry had attempted to advise Burgoyne of his 
success. On 6, 8 and 10 October he sent messengers to the 
north. Captain Campbell and Captain Thomas Scott were
7Bboth unable to penetrate and returned after several days.'
First Lieutenant Daniel Taylor made the third attempt.
68. Hotham to Lord Howe 9 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 
1222* PP* 431-2.
69* Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 78.
70. Putnam to Washington 8 Oct. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence.
I. PP. 441-2.
71. Parsons to Trumbull 9 Oct. 1777; Hall, Parsons. p. 119.
72. Wilkinson to George Clinton 9 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public 
Parers, II, p. 384n.
73. Vaughan to Clinton 19 Oct. 1777; Willcox, Portrait, p. 184.
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Warned by the report of Henry Williams in July, the Americans
were able to snap him up on 14 October. He carried his
message in a silver bullet which he swallowed when he
realized that he had identified himself to one of S. B. Webb's
patrols rather than one of Burgoyne's. This movement was
seen and a "severe dose of emetic tartar" was administered
74which caused him to disgorge it.' He was courtmartialed,
76found guilty, and hung on 18 October. Burgoyne remained 
unaware of Sir Henry's success until his scouts finally 
spotted Vaughan's advance elements on 16 October. By that 
time it was too late to continue resistance.^
Sir Henry began to consider the possibilities of ex­
ploiting his victory. However, he was very concerned with 
his defensive commitments which prevented his maintaining 
all the captured posts. Therefore, he destroyed Fort 
Montgomery and began strengthening Fort Clinton, which he 
renamed Fort Vaughan. Meanwhile, he left the bulk of the 
troops under Vaughan at Kings Ferry where they were in a 
position to either support Fort Vaughan or return to New 
York City. This latter possibility he considered very 
real as he had no information concerning the whereabouts of 
Washington. His hopes were buoyed when he received a 
letter from Major General Pigot offering one thousand men 
from Rhode Island. On 11 October Clinton returned to New
74. James Thacher, A Military Journal During the American
Revolutionary War. (2nd ed.; Boston: Cottons & Bernard, 
1827). p. 105. 75* Clinton, Public Papers. II,
p. 444n, Taylor's confession is in Ibid.. II, pp. 398-9*
76. Willcox, Portrait, p. 184.
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York City to prepare a renewal of the offensive. He ordered
Pigot to send the Forty-fifth Regiment and two German
battalions at once to the Highlands. He also ordered six
months1 provisions for five thousand men put on ships to
77be taken to Albany. 1
Sir Henry returned upriver on 12 October, the same
day Burgoyne was effectively surrounded. Vaughan and Wallace
were sent upriver on ships with orders to help Burgoyne,
78and if necessary to remain with him.f Vaughan had favored
using a much larger force, but Clinton felt that two
79thousand men were all that could be spared.'z A series
of ships were left on station throughout the Highlands to
provide communications, and at 5 PM on 12 October the lead
elements of the task force passed the Polopei chevaux-de-
frise. On 13 and 14 October the expedition passed upriver
80slowly, doing moderate damage. The Americans followed
8lalong both sides of the river.
On 15 October the British flotilla, escorted by the 
galleys Dependence. Crane, and Spitfire, brig Diligent, and
O p
tender Hotham. arrived off Kingston. When they were 
stalled there by adverse winds, two small batteries fired on 
the flotilla. Vaughan felt that since he was halted anyway, 
and since Kingston was “a nursury for almost every villain
77* Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 79*
78. Ibid.. pp. 79-80. 79. Ibid.. p. 8On.
80* Roosevelt, “Events on Hudson*s River," Log of the Depen­
dence. p. 98; Hotham to Lord Howe 24 Oct. 1777; Ibid., 
p. 115* 81. George Clinton to Committee
of Safety 12 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. II, p. 423. 
82. Roosevelt, "Events on Hudson * s River," p. 90.
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in the country,1 he should destroy these batteries. Troops
were landed and had no trouble scattering the defenders and
capturing the cannon. When they were sniped at from some
buildings by the militia, Vaughan had the entire town
burned to the ground. In the process a large amount of
stores were burned. Wallace also destroyed several small
ships. The galley Lady Washington escaped destruction by
being run up Roundout Creek and scuttled by her own crew.^
George Clinton's small force could not reach the town in
time to influence the action, and the state government
84decamped with great haste. Sir Henry was later to claim
8*5that the town was burned as a military necessity. ^ S. B. 
Webb was probably closer when he said "such cursed Barbarity 
is not equalled in History, Revenge for Burgoyne®s misfor* 
time seems their darling object."
On 17 October Burgoyne surrendered. Wallace and Vaughan 
continued upriver to Livingston's Manor, forty-five miles 
south of Albany, which they reached on 19 October. En route 
they destroyed some shipping and buildings. There the pilots 
refused to go further. Vaughan began to feel uneasy as the 
militia turned out to raise Putnam's force to about five 
thousand and George Clinton's to fifteen h u n d r e d . S i r  
Henry had meanwhile received an order from Howe to dispatch
83# Vaughan to Clinton 17 Oct. 1777; Almon, Remembrancer 
1777. pp. 427-8. 84. George Clinton to Putnam
15 Oct. 1777; Clinton, Public Papers. II, p. 438.
85* Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 81.
86. Webb, Journals. I, p. 231.
87# Clinton, American Rebellion, p. 80.
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three British regiments, two German battalions, and all 
detachments from units with the main army, even if he had
oo
moved upriver. Sir Henry wrote Vaughan to return to New
York City because of this order* The passes of the Highlands
89were also to be abandoned. 7 Vaughan retreated at 8 AM on
23 October.^ Port Clinton, now Port Vaughan, was abandoned
and destroyed on 25 October, and on the twenty-seventh the
91last British units arrived back at New York City.7 The 
Highlands were now completely in American hands again.
88. These units, the 7th, 26th, and 63rd British Regiments, 
the Jaegers, and the 1st and 2nd Anspach battalions, 
arrived at Billingsport, Pennsylvania, on 17 November.
An&rd, JournalT p. 6^.
89. Clinton. American Rebellion, pp. 80-1; Howe’s message 
is paraphrased in Howe to Germain 21 Oct. 1777; Manu­
scripts of Staoford-Sackville. II, pp. 78-9*
90. Webb, Journals. I, p. 233*
91* Hivlngton1s TNew York City) Royal Gazette. 1 Nov. 1777•
CHAPTER VII
THE SUBSEQUENT PATE OF THE HIGHLANDS AND AN 
EVALUATION OF THE EVENTS OF 1777
The same day that disaster struck the Highlands, 6
October 1777, the Continental Congress resolved that
Washington should send one of the army's four engineers
"to do duty at Fort Montgomery + the defences on Hudson's
R i v e r * O n  8 October Washington ordered Lieutenant
Colonel Louis LeBegue DuPortail to report to Putnam at
2Fort Montgomery. This was to prove very important in
the attempt to rebuild the fortress complex in the Highlands.
After the defeat of Burgoyne, a large element of 
Gates* army was freed for operations further south. Twenty 
regiments were directly requested by Washington on 29 
October, and a further two brigades were ordered from
'i
Putnam's share of the reinforcements on the next day.*'
This left several thousand Continentals still in the 
Highlands. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who 
had been sent north by Washington to- supervise forwarding
1. National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress 1774- 
1789. Transcript Journals. reel 17.
2. Washington to Hadiere 8 Oct. 1777; George Washington, 
Writings of George Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, 
T39 vols. ; ’Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 
IX, p. 339. (Hereafter referred to as Fitzpatrick.)
3. Library of Congress, George Washington Papers. (Presiden­
tial Papers Microfilms, 19bll, 3er, 3P, reel 25; Washing-• 
ton to Putnam 30 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick, IX, pp. 464~5»
89
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Gates* troops to Pennsylvania, ran into difficulty with 
Putnam* Hamilton wrote Washington on 2 November that Putnam
intended to retain four thousand Continentals to attack New
4 *York City* Washington wrote to Putnam on 4 November
directly ordering him to retain only enough troops to rebuild 
the forts and to send the rest immediately to relieve the 
weak main army*
fEhe threat from Canada was further alleviated on 8 
November when the British garrison at Port Ticonderoga 
destroyed that fortress and retreated. Putnam still pro­
crastinated, considering an attack on New York City* This
scheme was out of the realm of possibility and infuriated
6Hamilton, who referred to it as Putnam's "hobby-horse.”
George Clinton requested Gates to inspect the Highlands 
on his way to report to the Continental Congress, and com­
plained that Putnam was off in Westchester County leaving
7only the wrecked regiments to defend the Highlands. As
late as 27 December George Clinton could report that S. B.
Webb*s regiment had been repulsed in a raid on Long Island,
and that although
Gen'l Putnam is ordered to turn his Views to the
works for the Security of the River in Future.-
hardly anything is done yet at them little I
4* Hamilton to Washington 2 Nov. 1777; Jared Sparks, ed.,
Correspondence of the American Revolution. (4 vols.;
Boston: Little, Brown, 16537,11 ppV 24-5•
5* Washington to Putnam 4 Nov. 1777; Fitzpatrick, X, pp. 2-3.
6. Hamilton to Washington 10 Nov. 1777; Sparks, Correspondence,
IX, p. 33* 7. George Clinton to Gates 1?
Bee. 1??7; George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clinton, 
(10 vols.; Albany: State of New York, 189971 II, pp. 586-9.
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think is to be expected. The Good ManCsJ o
Views are not calculated for Things of this Sort.
A penetrating evaluation of Putnam, but unfortunately about
six months too late. New York City posed no threat, as Sir
Henry Clinton had a mere 6,142 men and felt that he was
q
limited to a static defense.'
The Continental Congress was deeply concerned with the 
refortification of the Highlands and passed a series of 
resolutions on 5 November to start action. Washington was 
to have Gates replace Putnam in the Highlands, send one or 
two more "able engineers" to assist him, and have Gates 
supervise the construction of new forts. Gates was or­
dered to collect all the galleys, chains, and other acces­
sories he felt necessary to obstruct the river, and was 
cautioned not to make the forts "too extensive, " and to 
Insure "that each be completed with a well, magazines, 
barracks, bomb casements VsheIters/ as would be sufficient 
for a determined defence."*^ Putnam and George Clinton 
both preferred West Point to the old Popolopen Creek site.**
Washington deferred to their better knowledge of the .
12countryside, and gave them a free hand.
On 12 January 1778 the first troops began construe-
11tion at West Point. J Lieutenant Colonel Radiere, the
8. George Clinton to Colonel William Maicom 27 Dec. 1777; 
Ibid., II, pp. 607-8. 9» Sir Henry Clinton, The
American Rebellion, ed. by William B. Willcox,~TNew 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 84.
10. Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 17*
11• Putnam to Washington ? Nov. 1777; Sparks, Correspon­
dence » II, P. 30. 12. Washington to Putnam II
Nov. 1777; Fitzpatrick, X, p. 40.
13. Hugh Hughes to G. Clinton 12 Jan. 1778; Clinton,
Public Papers. II, p. 672.
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engineer who replaced DuPortail, dissented and stirred up 
yet another argument. He insisted that the new fortress 
would be easily besieged because it was dominated by a 
series of hills. This defect did not exist at Popolopen
Ik
Creek. Washington reprimanded him, and ordered him to
go along with the majority and get something built before
1 5the spring opened the new campaigning season. ^
Progress began with this decision on the site, and 
the appointment of George Clinton to supervise the con­
struction on 18 February. In a resolution of that date the
Continental Congress appointed him to replace Gates under
16the provisions of the 5 November 177? resolutions.
Governor Clinton!s energy produced results. On 16 March 
Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, whose brigade was 
at work at West Point, wrote Washington informing him that 
the first guns were being emplaced, and that the main work,
i 7Fort Arnold, would be well advanced by the end of the month. { 
Major General Alexander McDougall, recently promoted, was
ordered to the Highlands on 16 March with orders to exercise
1 ft
command of the entire Highlands area and its dependencies.
He was equally energetic and could report on 13 April that
Ik. Radiere to Washington 13 Jan. 17?8; Elizabeth Kite,
Brigadier-General Louis Lebeque Duportail, (Washington: 
Institut Pranpais de Washington, 1933)> P* 86.
15* Washington to Radiere 25 Jan. 1778: Fitzpatrick, X, p. 3^9*
16. Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 17*
17* Parsons to Washington io Har. 1778; Charles S. Hall,
Life and Letters of Samuel Holden Parsons, (Binghamton,
N.Y. : Otseningo Publishing Company, .1985), PP* 158-7.
18. Washington to McDougall 16 Mar. 1778; Fitzpatrick, XI,
P. 95.
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the works were sufficiently advanced to preclude falling to
a sudden raid, but that they were still liable to a siege
because several important hills were as yet not defended.1^
A new chain was emplaced that spring, the necessary
hills were defended, and work continued throughout the war
to improve upon the defenses. In response to advice from
Washington, the Continental Congress formally created an
20independent command for the Highlands on 21 March. This
unified structure proved to be one of the most important
results of the fiasco of 1777. By March of 1779 Portress
West Point had reached a sufficient level of development
that the Americans desired a British attack on it. They were
-confident that such an attack would be shattered, and that
21they could counter-attack and recapture New York City. As
Surgeon Thacher wrote on 26 September 1778, West Point was
Considered by General Washington as the key which 
locks the communications between the eastern and 
southern states; and of all the pos£s in the United 
States, this Is the most important.
Prom 1??8 to the end of the war in 1783 the greater
Hudson Highlands became the center of the American strategy.
19. McDougall to Washington 13 Apr. 1778; Kite. Duportai1 . 
pp. 93-^• 20. Papers of the Continental
Conorress. Transcript Journals, reel 1?.
21. Louis Du Portail, Hemoire sur la defense de Wespoint, 
Translated typescript of the original at the United 
States Military Academy Library, ’West Point, N.Y.
22. James Thacher, A Military Journal During the American 
Revolutionary WarV" (2nd ed. : Boston: Cottons & Bernard,
1827T7~PP^ 210-11. The best source on the subsequent 
history of West Point in the war is Dave Richard Palmer, 
The River and the Rock: The History of Portress West
Point. 1775-T?j53f fbew York: Greenwood Publishing Co.,
19397.
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West Point was the fortress which anchored this defensive 
position. Only once was Washington to move the main field 
army from close supporting range of West Point, and that was 
in l?8l to destroy Cornwallis. Even then he left half of his 
force in the Highlands on constant alert, and took elaborate 
precautions to convince Sir Henry Clinton that Hew York City 
was his objective. Only minor skirmishing took place in the 
Northern half of American after the battle of Monmouth on 28 
June 1778, and this was dictated by Washington's refusal to 
abandon the Highlands, and British inability to attack him 
there. The Campaign of 1777 had taught this lesson to 
Washington, and it represents the turning point of the war 
in terms of strategic thinking. The importance of Washington's 
new strategy, which effectively stalemated the British in 
the northern colonies, qualifies this campaign to rank in 
importance with Valley Forge and Saratoga as one of the key 
factors in the ultimate American victory.
The first immediate repercussion of the Campaign of 
1777 had been a series of courts of inquiry into the actions 
of the principal commanding officers of the various forts 
which were captured in New York and Pennsylvania. Washing­
ton was ordered by the Continental Congress to establish 
such a court for the Highlands forts on 28 November 1777* 
Washington appointed Major General McDougall, Brigadier 
General Jedediah Huntington, and Colonel Edward Wiggles- 
worth as the investigating officers. Washington wrote to 
George Clinton that he fully expected the Clinton brothers,
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Putnam, and Parsons to be exonerated, as he felt it was a
case of simple bad judgement. He did expect it to be
a good excuse to retire Putnam, whom he felt had outlived
23his usefulness. ^
Actual responsibility for the loss of the forts must be
placed on Putnam for failing to make realistic defensive
preparations. He left the forts undermanned, dispersed his
Continentals, and ignored repeated warnings and indications
of a British advance. This was due to his inherent incapacity
as a general and not, as one contemporary accused him, of
having intimate relations with Beverly Robinson*s wife,
2k
revealing information to her, and being drunk. All the 
other officers on the scene behaved superbly. Washington 
has been accused of misunderstanding the British plans and 
drawing off too many Continentals from the Highlands. This 
is hindsight, While Washington did draw off the Continentals, 
he fully expected Putnam to replace them with militia, 
which Putnam failed to do. ^ In the light of the optimistic 
reports Putnam had been sending, and the other information 
he had, this was a reasonable request. Furthermore,
V/ashington had repeatedly issued instructions for the defense 
of the Highlands which, if followed, could have saved the 
forts, for he correctly foresaw the danger of an attack 
from the landward side.
23* Washington to George Clinton 12 Mar. 1778; to Robert 
Livingston 12 Mar. 1778; to Putnam 16 Mar. 1778; 
Fitzpatrick, XI, pp. 68, 69, 9A.
2km Letter from A VIRGINIA OFFICER, Hew York Packet and 
American Advertiser (Fishkill), 10 Dec. 1778.
25* Washington to George Clinton 15 Oct. 1777; Fitzpatrick,
ix ,  pp. 372-3.
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On the British side the most striking point is that 
after brilliantly siezing the Highlands, they abandoned them. 
Germain has been correctly blamed for the overall failure of 
coordination in the Campaign of 1777. This defect is not 
confined to this one campaign, but rather to the general 
attitude he maintained towards planning for the war. Sir 
William Howe claimed that there was no advantage In ascending 
the Hudson with his main army, and much to be gained by
P ^
attacking Philadelphia. This was indeed one of the great­
est British blunders of the war, exactly because it drew 
him away from the basically sound strategy of severing the 
colonies. His successes in Pennsylvania were meaningless.
As Henry Knox observed, n *Upon the whole, I know he ought 
(sic), in justice to his master, to go either up the North
Hiver or the eastward, and endeaver to form a juction
77with Burgoyne.*nw' Burgoyne can be dismissed as a blunderer 
who, knowing he would have no support, essentially threw 
his army away.
Sir Henry Clinton scored the most spectacular success 
of his career with a feat unparalleled by any other British 
commander in the war. Admittedly, it was physically 
impossible for him to rescue Burgoyne, and he could not hold
pQ
the Highlands once he had captured them. But Burgoyne and
26. Sir William Howe, 1 The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir 
William Howe, &c.,M in Bellamy Partridge, Sir Billy 
Howe. (New York; Longmans, Green and Co., 1932), pp.
27"6-7• ^7. Henry Knox to Lucy Knox
26 July 1777; Francis S. Drake, Life and Correspondence 
of Henry Knoxf (Boston: By the author, 1873), p. k60~
28. William B. Willcox, “Too Many Cooks: British Planning
Before Saratoga,” Journal of British Studies. II (Nov., 
1962), pp. 8?-8 .
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Howe must bear the responsibility for his being too late with
too little. This operation was "prompt, well planned,
successful, and fruitless. Clinton could score off the
29Americans, but not off Howe." 7
The one time in the war that the British army was able 
to sieze the single most important piece of terrain in the 
War of American Independence, they failed to retain it. The 
Americans never gave them a second chance.
29. William B. Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henr?f
Clinton in the War of Indepe ndence“ (New York! Alfred
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OP TECHNICAL TERMS
Abatis - An obstacle serving the function of barbed wire 
formed of trees felled toward the enemy.
Aide-de-camp - A staff officer.
Adjutant - A staff officer.
Battalion - The tactical unit in all armies, at this time 
virtually synonymous with regiment. It was usually 
composed of eight to then normal, or line, companies 
and two special, or flank, companies in British 
battalions.
Chevaux-de-frise - Underwater obstacles consisting of a
heavy timber frame bustling with iron-tipped spikes.
Commissary - A staff officer responsible for supply functions*
Coup-de-main - A sudden assault against a fortified position 
as opposed to a siege.
Fascines - Bundles of sticks used in military construction.
Flank Companies - Each British battalion had a light
infantry company and a grenadier company which were 
elite units frequently detached to form special 
battalions for specific campaigns.
Fleche - A small arrow-shaped earthwork open to the rear.
Fraise - A line of stakes imbedded as a horizontal palisade 
around a fortification.
Quartermaster - A staff officer responsible for supply 
functions.
Quartermaster General - Senior supply officer.
Rank and file - Those enlisted men present in the line of
battle with weapons, exclusive of sergeants and musicians.
Redan « A two-sided earthwork similar to a fleche.
Redoubt. - A relatively small independent outwork, completely 
enclosed, frequently used to protect the approaches to 
fortresses.
Regiment - In all armies the administrative unit of organi­
zation. Only certain regiments such as the Seventy- 
first Regiment had more than one battalion at this time.
Rifle pit - The forerunner of the modern foxhole.
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APPENDIX B 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MILITARY RANKS
Lieutenant General 
Major General 
Brigadier General 
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Captain
Captain-Lieutenant - Virtually synonymous with First 
Lieutenant*
*Pirst Lieutenant
^Second Lieutenant - Virtually synonymous with Ensign. 
^Ensign 
Sergeant 
Corporal 
Private
*A11 of these ranks were occasionally refered to as Subalterns*
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